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DEMOCRATIZING INTERPRETATION
ANYA BERNSTEIN*
ABSTRACT
Judges interpreting statutes sometimes seem eager to outsource the
work. They quote ordinary speakers to define a statutory term, point
to how an audience understands it, or pin it down with interpretive
canons. But sometimes conduct that appears to diminish someone’s
power instead sneakily enhances it. So it is with these forms of
interpretive outsourcing. Each seems to constrain judges’ authority
by handing the reins to someone else, giving interpretation a de-
mocratized veneer. But in fact, each funnels power right back to the
judge.
These outsourcing approaches show a disconnect between the
questions judges pose and the methods they use to seek answers. That
disconnect allows judges to avoid normative and empirical decisions
that are central to interpretation. Rather than taking a stand on
which community’s speech matters in a democracy, judges pick
quotations they like or use empirical techniques like corpus linguis-
tics without acknowledging the underlying choices they entail.
Rather than identifying whom statutes address and considering
their attitudes, judges speak for an audience to whom they do not
listen. Rather than articulating what purposes canons serve, judges
choose a rule that appeals. 
Outsourcing seems to alleviate countermajoritarian difficulties by
democratizing interpretation and yielding interpretive certainty. But
our common law adjudication system empowers judges to maintain
* Associate Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School. I have benefitted from critique and
suggestions from Guyora Binder, Michael Boucai, Michael Coenen, Richard Fallon, James
Gardner, Carissa Hessick, Jud Mathews, Jack Schlegel, Glen Staszewski, and Matthew
Steilen, as well as comments in response to presentations at SUNY Buffalo Law School, the
Academia Sinica Institutum Iurisprudentiae, and the Law and Society Association meeting.
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indeterminacy, creating moments of provisional closure always
subject to reinterpretation. Rather than evaluating how well judges
resist the authority our system gives them, we should ask how well
they justify the way they wield it. Really democratizing interpretation
involves both considering methods to yield answers to judges’
questions and recognizing any method’s limitations. It also means
acknowledging that interpretation remains presumptively open to
contestation. Such openness and humility is implicit in the require-
ment of judicial reason-giving, and it democratizes interpretation
more than outsourcing can.
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I. INTRODUCTION: OUTSOURCING TO DEMOCRATIZE
Judges interpreting statutes sometimes act uncomfortable with
the power they wield. Commentators, too, have pushed judges to
minimize their interpretive authority.1 But sometimes an act that
seems to diminish someone’s power sneakily preserves or even
enhances it instead. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu presents a nice
example: a newspaper praises a provincial French mayor for the
“thoughtful gesture” of giving a speech in the local dialect.2 Why is
speaking to constituents in their own language so very thoughtful?
Only because of an unspoken background hierarchy that ranks di-
alects lower than standard French.3 Everyone concerned “tacitly
recognize[s] the unwritten law which prescribes [standard] French
as the only acceptable language for formal speeches.”4 By appearing
to subvert existing power relations, the mayor actually “derive[s]
profit” from them.5
I argue here that American judges (and legal theorists) often do
something similar when discussing the interpretation of statutes.6
They seem to outsource the authority to interpret while actually
keeping power firmly in the judge’s hands. Judges are subtly pushed
to outsource in this way by a legal culture that is suspicious of their
power, and that treats statutory interpretation as largely a quest for
a single right answer. In contrast, the legal system judges operate
1. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22, 40-41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
2. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 68 (John B. Thompson ed.,
1991). A recent New York Times column provides a quick introduction to Bourdieu’s influ-
ential work. David Brooks, Getting Radical About Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/opinion/inequality-pierre-bourdieu.html?smid-pl-share
[https://perma. cc/L6Z5-GDJ7]. 
3. BOURDIEU, supra note 2, at 68.
4. Id.
5. Id. Bourdieu’s mayor thus gets praise for stooping to speak the language of the people
precisely because he represents the power that enforces the linguistic hierarchy in the first
place. See id.
6. I use Supreme Court opinions to exemplify judicial approaches because they are well
known and because they set the tone for the judiciary. At the same time, it seems likely that
the practices I describe here work differently in different courts. I do not aim to catalogue the
full field of possibilities; rather, my goal is to illuminate some influential tendencies. 
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in facilitates, and even depends on, ambiguity and change. It also
vests great power in judges, whether they like it or not.
Subject to these contradictory demands—to hold power but not to
wield it, to find answers that are final, yet subject to reinterpreta-
tion—judges might understandably attempt to outsource interpre-
tive responsibility to less controversial sources. It seems likely that
judges often attempt to outsource in good faith. That does not,
however, make these practices any more rational; the point is the
effect, not the intent. As I explain below, both outsourcing interpre-
tation and the impression of certainty it supports actually under-
mine whatever democratic impulses may give rise to them.7 Asking
judges to give up the discretion we thrust on them only promotes
that internal contradiction.
Instead of asking judges to give up the authority we give them, we
should demand that they exercise that authority well. That
requires, first of all, responsible reason-giving. Reason-giving is a
central requirement in our system—it is part of how our common-
law adjudicative structure supports the rule of law instead of un-
dermining it.8 But reason-giving can only do its legitimating work
if the reasons given are themselves reasonable. In this context, that
involves acknowledging, and providing justification for, the ways
judges arrive at interpretations. It also involves acknowledging the
limits of those approaches and developing them to better suit the
inquiry. I suggest that letting method take a central role and recog-
nizing the inevitable limitations of any interpretive approach serves
democracy better than imagining an external arbiter of meaning to
provide an illusory certainty.
In previous work, I identified two structuring but usually in-
visible choices on which statutory interpretation depends.9 First,
judges must select what they will interpret, such as a statutory
term, an entire phrase, or an idea the statute implicates.10 Judges
also have to situate the thing they will interpret within a context
they themselves construct by drawing, for instance, on the statute,
7. See infra Part V.
8. Mathilde Cohen, The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reasons, 96 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE [ARCHIVES PHIL. L. & SOC. PHIL.] 1, 3 (2010) (“[L]egal reason giving is one
of the essential properties of the concept of the rule of law, if not the essential one.”).
9. See generally Anya Bernstein, Before Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 (2017).
10. See id. at 572-93.
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other legal sources from different time periods, general legal princi-
ples, nonlegal sources, or their own understandings about how the
world works.11
Selecting and situating statutory text form the infrastructure for
any interpretation.12 There is thus no way to avoid making crucial
normative and methodological choices in legal interpretation. Yet,
legal writers often avoid acknowledging such decisions by laying
claim to objective, inevitable, or independently legitimate justifica-
tions.13
In this Article, I focus on three ways that judicial opinions situate
statutory text: in ordinary language use, in audiences’ understand-
ings of linguistic expression, and in canons setting out interpretive
rules. Each approach appears to outsource interpretive power to
others—ordinary speakers, legal audiences, and generalized rules—
but actually hands it right back to the judge. This process depends
on not acknowledging the decisions underlying each approach. This
Article illuminates those hidden choices and their implications for
interpretation.
I first introduce three common ways judges outsource inter-
pretation. In Part II, I explain how judges appear to hand the in-
terpretive reins over to ordinary speakers. The sources they choose,
however, are neither reliable nor relevant indicators of the language
use they claim to present. Even more reliable methods such as cor-
pus linguistics require judges to make hard decisions. Whose speech
should count? How can we access it? What data helps interpret the
nonordinary language of statutes? While appearing to give interpre-
tation over to ordinary speakers, then, judges actually hand it right
back to themselves.14
Part III considers how judges outsource interpretation to a stat-
ute’s audience. Textualism instructs judges to interpret a statute as
its addressees would understand it.15 Yet, textualism also precludes
identifying who comprises that audience and proscribes recourse to
any actual audience’s view. This odd mismatch of aspiration and
11. See id. at 593-629.
12. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
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technique rests on a formalist view of lawmaking that stands in con-
siderable tension with our actual legal system.
Part IV considers how judges outsource to canons of interpreta-
tion laid down by other legal actors over time. Judges use canons in
notoriously inconsistent ways, at least in part because there is no
ordering principle for choosing among them. I argue that the real
problem is deeper: we have little reflection on, much less agreement
about, what ends canons do—or should—serve.16 Thus, even judges
who submit to binding rules must choose how to be bound.
Part V considers what outsourcing accomplishes and what it
elides. Judges’ claims to neutral, objective sources that yield inter-
pretive certainty obscure the normative and methodological deci-
sions that inevitably go into interpretation, as well as the way that
legal pronouncements are inherently subject to reinterpretation.17
That can be distressing; outsourcing may address that distress by
giving judges recourse to something larger than themselves. Yet,
our system vests great power in judges to exercise judgment.
Insisting that judges abdicate the very authority we also insist
they wield makes for a quixotic quest. Though it may be more dif-
ficult, facing indeterminacy head on serves our democratic aspi-
rations better.18
Part V also suggests that rather than accepting specious claims
to certainty, we should assume that interpretation will be subject to
16. See infra Part IV.
17. Utterances with social effects, such as laws, are generally subject to reinterpretation
over time. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 25, 197-99 (1958) (describing
efficacious, yet contingent, action and speech as that “out of which rises the realm of human
affairs”).
18. Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars have written extensively on the indeterminacy
of legal language, which I take as relatively uncontroversial. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 133-34 (1997). My exploration of indeterminacy takes a different
direction. I focus on those practices I call outsourcing, which others have not discussed.
Rather than critiquing ideology, I analyze legal practice, drawing on empirical approaches to
communication. Most importantly, CLS scholars generally present the contestable nature of
legal language as undermining the law’s legitimacy. See, e.g., Kenneth Kress, Legal In-
determinacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989) (noting that the CLS position that “law is
radically indeterminate ... may raise serious doubts about the possibility of legitimate, non-
arbitrary legal systems”). In contrast, I see indeterminacy as a condition of possibility for the
ongoing work of legitimation that democratic governance involves. See generally Anya
Bernstein, Bureaucratic Speech: Language Choice and Democratic Identity in the Taipei Bu-
reaucracy, 40 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL  ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 28 (2017) (analyzing microprac-
tices of democratic legitimation in a particular cultural context).
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debate and scrutinize interpreters’ methods. Democratizing inter-
pretation might require judges to more explicitly make and defend
the hard decisions that outsourcing obscures. That is just what the
requirement of judicial reason-giving implies.19
Finally, my critique suggests that the audiences and evaluators
of legal interpretation—that is, all of us—should avoid asking how
well a given approach fixes a meaning.20 Instead, we might consider
how it affects interpretive power and legal authority in practice. In
this, we would only be acknowledging the obvious: that judges are
not strangers to the system of legal power in our democracy, but
rather form an integral part of it. Since there is no denying that
power, it makes sense to evaluate how judges wield and distribute
it. Bourdieu calls his mayor’s dip into dialect a “strategy of conde-
scension.”21 We should not stand for being condescended to.
II. THE USES OF LANGUAGE USE
Judges sometimes base assertions about what statutory terms
mean on evidence of how others use those terms.22 They might quote
instances of language use to demonstrate what a term means to
speakers23 or cite a dictionary that describes the term’s contours.24
This seems to fix meaning through a normative appeal that itself is
based on an empirical claim. The empirical claim is that people—
some people—use the term in some particular way. The normative
appeal suggests that those people are, in some democratically ap-
propriate way, the relevant ones for determining the meaning in the
statute.
Opinions generally leave this claim about factually accurate dem-
ocratic propriety implicit. But that assumption—that the quotation
presents an accurate depiction of democratically relevant language
use—is important. It is what renders an opinion’s reliance on the
19. See generally Cohen, supra note 8.
20. See infra Part VI.
21. BOURDIEU, supra note 2, at 68.
22. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
23. Id.
24. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1994); Pittston Coal
Grp. v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988); St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11
(1987).
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language use of others legitimate. Without that assumption, the
language use of others would be extraneous to the legal interpreta-
tion. Of course, not all opinions that quote the language use of
others take it as dispositive evidence of meaning. Opinions some-
times use others’ language use to get a sense of what a word might
mean, or even to show the absence of a clear answer. In this Article,
I am particularly interested in situations where judges present in-
formation about language use as though it solved the problem of
meaning-making. But even more moderated deployments of lan-
guage use necessarily posit that a quotation accurately represents
relevant language use. Otherwise, why use it?
Looking closer, though, reveals that both the empirical and the
normative assumptions are often weak, if not absurd. Opinions
routinely do not offer empirically valid presentations of how a given
community of speakers uses a legal term: what poses as evidence
turns out to be merely instances that comport with judges’ intu-
itions. Contrary to what one would think reading the materials in
legislation classes, many opinions do not bother with much evidence
at all, simply making assertions about what words mean as a way
of interpreting those very words.
The sources judges use, moreover, are often difficult to square
with the idea of democratic relevance. Opinions turn to the speech
of people who lived long before the relevant statute was enacted, or
in places it does not reach; or they show great concern for the speech
habits of some groups affected by some statutes, but ignore others
affected by other statutes.
If judicial quotation represents the ordinary speech habits of any
democratically relevant community, it turns out to be the commu-
nity of federal judges. This group emerges as independent decision-
makers who base judgments on their intuitions about the meaning
of linguistic terms. That is certainly one version of democratic
legitimacy; in fact, it seems to be one our legal system favors.25 But
it conflicts with the implicit claims of interpretive outsourcing, with
much judicial self-presentation, and with a lot of commentary. For
all the countermajoritarian hand-wringing, though, judges seem
pretty comfortable saying what the law means.26
25. See infra Part V.
26. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Some have suggested that more empirical evidence about lan-
guage use could get us out of this fix.27 In particular, legal scholars
and practitioners have recently become interested in corpus linguis-
tics, a method of linguistic analysis that uses large data sets of
language use in speech and print.28 Such analysis is certainly in-
teresting, and might be productive, in the legal context. But em-
piricism cannot resolve normative questions. How should we draw
the boundaries of the speech community that determines what a
word means? How should we understand the relationship between
the ordinary speech habits of that community and the quite ex-
traordinary utterances embodied in federal statutes? What is it, ex-
actly, that we look for in the empirical record? As long as they avoid
these normative and methodological issues, legal writers basing in-
terpretations in the language use of others will be stuck in the cir-
cular logic this Part describes.
A. Quotation, Relevance, and Reliability
Any reference to how language is used points to a communicative
community—the group of users who use language that way. It also
presents an empirical claim: an assertion about a fact in the world.
So opinions that base interpretations on evidence of how language
is used outside the statute make at least implicit claims to both
relevance and reliability. That is, they imply that the speech they
draw on represents the community of speakers most relevant to
determining the meaning of the statute. And they imply that their
assertions about how those speakers use language are accurate in
some empirically falsifiable way.
The classic opinions that use this strategy, however, fail pitifully
on both counts. Take Muscarello v. United States, in which a federal
statute mandated prison time for a person who “‘carrie[d] a firearm’
‘during and in relation to’ a ‘drug trafficking crime.’”29 Did a de-
fendant who had a gun locked in his glove compartment while sell-
ing marijuana “carry” the gun for the purposes of the mandatory
27. See infra notes 74-76.
28. See infra notes 74-76.
29. 524 U.S. 125, 126 (1998) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994)).
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minimum?30 In concluding that he did, the majority famously
quoted, among others, the King James Bible and Moby-Dick to
elucidate how the word “carry” was used in the statute.31
Why would the King James Bible and Moby-Dick be relevant to
interpreting the statute? The implication was that the writers of
these texts represented ordinary speech when the statute was
passed in the 1960s.32 But just stating that implication indicates
how absurd it is.33 It suggests that the speech communities relevant
to understanding a 1960s American statute applied in the 1990s are
1600s Britain and 1850s America. The opinion does not even try to
explain why either of these quite different speech communities—
much less both—would be democratically relevant to the task. We
have enough problems with “dead hand” issues in our own Consti-
tution without making the literati of King James’s court our guides
to twentieth-century American statutes.
Nor does Muscarello address the fact that these works of litera-
ture are, by any measure, not ordinary.34 They are life changing,
genre changing, even language changing. Why, then, would they
demonstrate ordinary language use?35 This is beautiful evidence,
but it is not evidence of how normal people spoke.
Classic works that are less glaring in their originality share these
evidentiary limitations. In Whitfield v. United States, for instance,
the Court considered whether “enhanced penalties for anyone who
‘forces any person to accompany him’ in the course of ... fleeing
from a bank robbery” applied to a “bank robber [who] forces some-
one to move with him” only over “substantial” distances, or whether
30. Id. at 127.
31. See id. at 129.
32. See id.
33. See Stephen C. Mouritsen, Note, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional
Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1940
(“Imagine that I were able to mimic perfectly the English of ... the Bible .... In what context
would such speech be considered ordinary?”). 
34. See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 129.
35. On the unusual qualities of Moby-Dick, for example, see Ta-Nehisi Coates, And Now
for a Much Deserved Moment of Insanity, ATLANTIC (May 26, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.
com/entertainment/archive/2011/05/and-now-for-a-much-deserved-moment-of-insanity/
239536/ [https://perma.cc/LM26-NX5N] (“This is the greatest paragraph in any work of fiction,
at any point, in all of history. And not just human history, but galactic and extra-terrestrial
history too.”).
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moving from a hallway to an adjoining room would suffice.36 A short
unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia held that the meaning of
“accompany” did not depend on the distance covered.37 The opinion
quoted Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice and Charles Dickens’s
David Copperfield, noting that “English literature is replete with
examples.”38
It may well be. But do novels written by British English speakers
in 1813 and 1850, respectively, exemplify ordinary American En-
glish usage in 1934, when the statute was enacted, or in the 2000s,
when it was applied? Just think of the scene where another Austen
heroine endures an unwelcome suitor “making violent love to her.”39
In eighteenth-century England, that phrase meant to “profess[ ] ...
love for” someone.40 You would read a quite different Emma if you
thought that phrase involved sexual intercourse—a meaning the
phrase acquired in America around the time Congress enacted the
statute at issue in Whitfield.41 This outsourcing neither picks out a
democratically relevant speech community, nor provides a reliable
indication of how even irrelevant people spoke.
Opinions thus seek to render legal terms determinate by situating
them in the mouths of other speakers, but present evidence that
simply cannot demonstrate how relevant speakers spoke. A similar
problem pervades citation to dictionaries.42 The Oxford English
36. 135 S. Ct. 785, 787-88 (2015).
37. Id. at 788 (“[D]efining ‘accompany’ as: ‘To go in company with, to go along with.’”
(citing Accompany, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1933))).
38. Id.
39. JANE AUSTEN, THE ANNOTATED EMMA 226-29 (David M. Shapard ed., 2012).
40. Id. (explaining that at the time Austen wrote, “making violent love to” meant “pro-
fessing or demonstrating passionate love for,” and that “‘making love’ had no further meaning
then”). 
41. See Love, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/110566?
redirectedFrom=make+love#eid%201220598243 [https://perma.cc/539Q-87KA] (dating the
first attestation of “make love” meaning “have sex” to an American text from 1927).
42. James Brudney and Lawrence Baum found that opinions using dictionaries were
nonchalant on the question of historical era. See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis
or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55
WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 512 (2013). No Justice has “articulate[d] a principled preference
between” dictionaries from the time of a statute’s enactment, as opposed to the time of litiga-
tion. Id. Brudney and Baum note, “the dictionaries they cite often are not contemporaneous
with either the enactment date or filing date. This suggests a larger lack of interest by the
Court in aligning its dictionary use with factors relevant to individual cases.” Id. Stephen
Mouritsen has catalogued incorrect assumptions about dictionaries that Supreme Court
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Dictionary (OED), for instance, is an enduring favorite.43 First
published in 1928, it started including American usage in its 1972
edition.44 However, opinions do not distinguish entries drawn from
OED editions that include American usage from those that do not.45
Opinions do not even differentiate American from other uses in a
given edition.46 Why should the language habits of Britons dictate
our understanding of an American statute?
Odder still, Supreme Court Justices sometimes claim to demon-
strate ordinary language use by quoting dictionaries that instruct
readers on correct use.47 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s well-known an-
tipathy to Webster’s Third International Dictionary rests on his
preference for prescriptive over descriptive approaches.48 But ought
is not is. The prescriptions of a few dictionary editors can hardly
support an empirical claim about the ordinary usage of a term in
opinions commonly express or imply, such as that the order of entries indicates frequency of
use, and that entries rest on empirically validated research about ordinary speech. See
Mouritsen, supra note 33, at 1921-41.
43. The Court cited the OED in 20 percent of the cases in Brudney and Baum’s sample of
695 majority opinions from the 1986-2010 Supreme Court terms. See Brudney & Baum, supra
note 42, at 516-17, 529.
44. See History of the OED, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://public.oed.com/history/
[https://perma.cc/CEJ4-AXVY] (explaining that information about English-speaking regions
outside Britain, such as “North America, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, South Asia,
and the Caribbean,” was not added until 1972).
45. See, e.g., Bullock v. BankChampaign, N. A., 569 U.S. 267, 271-73 (2013).
46. See id. at 272.
47. See David Foster Wallace, Tense Present: Democracy, English, and the Wars over
Usage, HARPER’S MAG., Apr. 2001, at 39, 40-58 (discussing the distinction between
prescriptive and descriptive dictionaries).
48. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary was the first in America to adamantly
take the position that “the dictionary’s purpose was to report the language, not to prescribe
what belonged in it.” Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become
a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 242
(1999) (footnote omitted). Justice Scalia repeatedly expressed his displeasure with this
edition. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227 (1994) (discussing
a definition given in Webster’s Third and concluding, “[i]t is hard to see how that can be”);
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, A Note on the Use of Dictionaries, 16 GREEN BAG 419, 427
(2013) (cautioning readers that Webster’s Third should be “used cautiously because of its
frequent inclusion of doubtful, slipshod meanings without adequate usage notes”); Transcript
of Oral Argument at 13, Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012) (No. 10-
1472), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2011/10-1472.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8GS-XKTE] (saying about Webster’s Third, “It’s not a very good diction-
ary”).
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any speech community—not even the community of dictionary
editors.49
This kind of outsourcing ignores the way that language use oc-
curs, and changes, through practice in social context. There is no
Platonic form to which language use comports. Yet Supreme Court
Justices sometimes express an almost touching faith in the realism
and accuracy of linguistic terms.50 In Rapanos v. United States, for
instance, dredged and fill material in wetlands would fall under the
statutory purview of the Clean Water Act if the material flowed
downstream to “navigable waters.”51 Justice Stevens, writing in dis-
sent joined by four Justices, proceeded logically: “the very existence
of words like ‘alluvium’ and ‘silt’ in our language ... suggests that at
least some fill makes its way downstream.”52 Nouns, that is, must
refer to actual things. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion snidely
rejected this “philological approach,”53 proposing its own linguistic
deduction: “the deposit of mobile pollutants,” such as chemicals, into
wetlands was “naturally described as an ‘addition ... to’” down-
stream waters, “while the deposit of stationary fill material general-
ly is not.”54 If we call it stationary, in other words, we can rely on it
to stay put. The plurality and dissent thus both find words reliable
indicators of reality. In contrast, the disenchantments of everyday
life teach most of us that not all nouns refer to things that actually
exist, and that adjectives sometimes fail to accurately describe their
objects.55
Justice Scalia’s discussion in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
AT&T Co. displays a related faith in the logical consistency of
49. Even stranger, Justice Scalia apparently had no quarrel with the OED, which has
been proudly descriptive from the start. SIMON WINCHESTER, THE MEANING OF EVERYTHING:
THE STORY OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xxiii (2003) (explaining how the first OED
drew on millions of “illustrative quotations” submitted by private individuals). Furthermore,
“most contemporary dictionaries are characterized as descriptive rather than prescriptive.”
Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 48, at 243.
50. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723, 743 (2006) (plurality opinion).
51. See id. at 744-45 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(12) (2000)).
52. Id. at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 744 n.11 (plurality opinion).
54. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000)).
55. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2003) (“Nor is how we carve up conceptual space into word mean-
ings completely determined by nature.”).
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language.56 That case concerned whether the statutory term “mod-
ify” could include fundamental changes or only minor ones.57 Most
dictionaries said minor, while Webster’s Third and its followers
listed both.58 Justice Scalia, writing for a four Justice majority, re-
jected that definition because it “contradict[ed] one of the meanings
contained in virtually all other dictionaries,” and even contradicted
an “alternative meaning[ ] ... in ... Webster’s Third itself.”59 Web-
ster’s Third, the opinion noted, “define[d] ‘modify’ to connote both
(specifically) major change and (specifically) minor change. It is
hard to see how that can be.”60
 But of course, multivalence is commonplace in language, even at
the level of ordinary lexical definition. Lovers cleave to one another
and no one should cleave them apart. You cut a tree down before you
cut it up. Is a parent who sanctions bad behavior permissive or, on
the contrary, punishing? Indeed, just three years earlier, Justice
Scalia himself had joined Chapman v. United States, an opinion that
relied on dictionary definitions to conclude that LSD both “can be
released [from its carrier] by dropping the [carrier] into a liquid”
and “cannot be ... easily separated from” its carrier.61 It is hard to
see why the term “mixture” can encompass two characteristics that
are physically incompatible, but “modify” cannot encompass two
gradations of a single concept—a common form of multivalence.
Occasionally, Justices appeal to seemingly objective indicia of
ordinariness. Seeking to ascertain whether the ordinary meaning of
“carry” included a firearm in a glove compartment, the majority in
Muscarello v. United States “surveyed modern press usage ... by
searching computerized newspaper data bases,” sampling from
56. See generally 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
57. Id. at 225.
58. See id. at 225-26.
59. Id. at 227.
60. Id.
61. 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991). The Chapman majority viewed the key issue as whether
pure LSD and its carrier constituted a “mixture” under the statute. Id. at 461-62. One
dictionary defined “mixture” as having two or more components that, “however thoroughly
commingled[,] are regarded as retaining a separate existence.” Id. at 462 (quoting Mixture,
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986)). Another said it meant “two
substances blended together so that the particles of one are diffused among the particles of
the other.” Id. (quoting Mixture, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)). The majority
opinion chose both, without mentioning that they contradicted each other. See id. at 461-63.
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thousands of sentences with “the words ‘carry,’ ‘vehicle,’ and
‘weapon’ (or variations thereof).”62 This is a bit like asking whether
most deaths are caused by terrorist attacks, then counting terrorist
attacks rather than deaths.63 Since “carry” appears in more utter-
ances than “carry” and “vehicle” together do, searching only within
the combination cannot tell us how “carry” itself is ordinarily used.64
Justice Breyer may have located a relevant speech community, but
his method could not yield a reliable answer to the question he
needed to answer.
A differently flawed stab at empirical verification appeared at
oral argument in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., which
considered whether a statute allowing attorneys’ fees for interpret-
ers applied only to those who worked with verbal expressions, or
also to those who worked with written text.65 Justice Alito had an
idea for Mr. Taniguchi’s attorney: “Suppose somebody did a com-
puter search in a database of ... newspaper articles, magazine ar-
ticles for ... the term ‘interpreter.’”66 Out of “a thousand hits,” he
asked, “[h]ow many ... do you think would use the term ‘interpreter’
to refer to rendering a written document from one language to
another?”67
The database Justice Alito imagined exists, as do articulated
methodologies for performing the kind of search he suggested.68 But
the whole idea of investigating the empirical question that Justice
62. 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998).
63. See Mouritsen, supra note 33, at 1947 (calling the Muscarello majority’s inquiry
“fatally flawed”). 
64. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84, 90-98 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982) (discussing the “conjunction fallacy,” in which a person intuits, against the laws
of probability, that specific conditions are more probable than a general encompassing
condition, or that the co-occurrence of two conditions is more probable than the occurrence of
a single one of them). The Muscarello majority, for instance, found that “carry” in the sense
of convey in a vehicle characterized “perhaps more than one-third” of examples in its skewed
sample, but still chose that meaning. 524 U.S. at 129. The majority did not explain why a
minority-of-a-minority usage would count as ordinary. See id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“One is left to wonder what meaning showed up some two-thirds of the time.”).
65. See generally 566 U.S. 560 (2012).
66. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560
(2012) (No. 10-1472), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
2011/10-1472.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8GS-XKTE].
67. Id.
68. See infra Part II.B. 
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Alito claimed to be interested in turned out to be kind of a joke.
After Mr. Taniguchi’s lawyer suggested that the number might be
“more than 50 percent of the hits” in the proposed data set, Justice
Kagan commented, “[y]ou’re, like, daring Justice Alito to go do this
now,” leading to laughter in the courtroom.69 When Justice Alito
pressed the lawyer, “How much would you bet?,” the audience
laughed again.70 “If you bet me enough,” Justice Alito continued, “I’ll
look at a thousand. I’d be surprised if it’s 2 percent.”71 The attorney’s
demurral—“I couldn’t venture a guess, and I would rather not bet
you”—led to yet another round of laughter in the courtroom.72 In
this way, Justice Alito couched his intuitions about language use in
something that sounded empirical, but was entirely imaginary—and
apparently funny to boot.73
To sum up, opinions routinely fail to give rational support for
their assertions about how speakers use language. They rest in-
terpretive assertions on evidence about speakers who are clearly not
relevant, for instance by treating England (but not other English-
speaking countries such as Canada or Australia) as part of America
for statutory purposes, or by drawing on speech that greatly
predates the statute. They do not justify treating some speakers
rather than others as relevant, and generally do not even acknowl-
edge the implicit claims of relevance that underlie the use of others’
language use. And they have little interest in, or competence at,
testing the reliability of their claims about how speakers speak.
B. Linguistics and Democracy
What if we could change judges’ competence at reliably depicting
ordinary language? There are, after all, pretty good methods for
determining how at least some speakers commonly speak. The
crowdsourcing impulses of the Muscarello majority and the
Taniguchi colloquy gesture toward corpus linguistics, a linguistic
69. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 66, at 39.
70. Id. at 39-40.
71. Id. at 40.
72. Id.
73. Native speaker intuitions about things such as word frequency and patterns of word
use are notoriously unreliable. See generally Michael Silverstein, The Limits of Awareness,
in LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 382, 382-83 (Alessandro Duranti ed., 2001). 
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technique that studies what words mean to speakers and what con-
stitutes idiomatic usage.74 Scholars collect massive databases to
analyze the linguistic patterns of things such as naturally occurring
conversations and published texts.75 Linguists track things such as
the grammatical structures a word appears in, the other words it
tends to appear with, the social situations it tends to crop up in, the
kinds of responsive expressions it tends to elicit, and so on. That
helps them map the word’s place in language and derive the mean-
ings and implications it is likely to carry for speakers.76
Corpus linguistics thus applies big-data analytics to delineate the
range of pretheoretical, intuitive reactions a word is likely to elicit
in a fluent speaker.77 This method joins others developed by scholars
working in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology, among other
empirical fields.78
74. See generally Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012); Muscarello v.
United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
75. See GENA R. BENNETT, USING CORPORA IN THE LANGUAGE LEARNING CLASSROOM:
CORPUS LINGUISTICS FOR TEACHERS 2 (2010) (“A corpus is a large, principled collection of
naturally occurring examples of language stored electronically.... [C]orpus linguistics serves
to answer two fundamental research questions: (1) What particular patterns are associated
with lexical or grammatical features? (2) How do these patterns differ within varieties and
registers?”); GRAEME KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPUS LINGUISTICS 3 (1998) (“[T]here
are many different kinds of corpora.”); Mouritsen, supra note 33, at 1954-70 (explaining the
basics of corpus linguistics); see also CHRIS HEFFER, THE LANGUAGE OF JURY TRIAL: A CORPUS-
AIDED ANALYSIS OF LEGAL-LAY DISCOURSE 59 (2005) (using a trial transcript corpus to analyze
how legal professionals communicate with laypeople in trials). See generally Vijay K. Bhatia,
Nicola N. Langton & Jane Lung, Legal Discourse: Opportunities and Threats for Corpus
Linguistics, in 16 DISCOURSE IN THE PROFESSIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM CORPUS LINGUISTICS
203 (Ulla Connor & Thomas A. Upton eds., 2004) (exploring the utility of corpus approaches
to differentiating legal discourse from other forms of communication); £ucja Biel, Corpus-
Based Studies of Legal Language for Translation Purposes: Methodological and Practical
Potential, in RECONCEPTUALIZING LSP: ONLINE PROCEEDINGS OF THE XVII EUROPEAN LSP
SYMPOSIUM 2009, 1 (Carmen Heine & Jan Engberg eds., 2010), www.asb.dk/fileadmin/www.
asb.dk/isek/biel.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK5F-WJLF].
76. See, e.g., John W. Du Bois, Discourse and Grammar, in THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF LAN-
GUAGE: COGNITIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE STRUCTURE 47, 49 (Michael
Tomasello ed., 2003).
77. Id. (“The real story of discourse and grammar research is that there is a place for
pattern, and generalization, in both domains. Discourse and grammar each claim a distinctive
type of patterning, neither of which is reducible to the other. And yet ... grammar and dis-
course interact with and influence each other in profound ways ... so that in real life neither
can even be accessed, not to mention explained, without reference to the other.”).
78. See generally PAUL BAKER, SOCIOLINGUISTICS AND CORPUS LINGUISTICS (2010).
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One thing to note: judicial opinions adverting to ordinary lan-
guage use overwhelmingly convey the impression that it is fairly
easy to determine what ordinary language use consists of.79 The
existence of several branches of scholarly inquiry built around com-
plex methodologies deployed to determine what constitutes ordinary
usage should at least suggest that this is not the case. Deciding how
ordinary people usually use language is often not simple, obvious,
or conclusive—not something you can ascertain by quoting a dic-
tionary or a favorite novel.80
1. Speech Communities and Their Habits
Recently, several scholars and judges have proposed incorporating
corpus linguistics into legal interpretation.81 The proposal has
sparked some lively discussion.82 Several judicial opinions already
reflect or discuss this impulse.83 Since judges make claims about the
ordinary usage of statutory terms anyway, it seems reasonable to
want to give those assertions some empirical grounding. But, like
any analytical modality, corpus linguistics is not a transparent
revelation of objective truth. It requires making decisions that, in
the legal context, are inevitably normative.
79. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227 (1994).
80. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
2027, 2059 (2005) (noting the possible utility of corpus linguistics to statutory interpretation).
Solan also notes that courts are “bankrupt ... when they must actually decide just what makes
ordinary meaning ordinary.” Id. at 2053.
81. See generally Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning,
127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018).
82. Carissa Hessick’s recent posts about corpus linguistics to a legal scholarship discus-
sion website, for instance, inspired sustained discussion in the comments. See Carissa Byrne
Hessick, Corpus Linguistics Re-Redux, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 25, 2017, 9:56 AM), prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/09/corpus-linguistics-re-redux.html [https://perma.cc/8LRV-
CZUX] (discussing the issue and linking to other posts with separate comments); see also Ben
Zimmer, The Corpus in the Court: ‘Like Lexis on Steroids’, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2011), https://
www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/03/the-corpus-in-the-court-like-lexis-on-steroids/
72054/ [https://perma.cc/7EXZ-9CWC]. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Lin-
guistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1503 [hereinafter Corpus Linguistics].
83. For instance, a concurring opinion in a Utah Supreme Court case undertook a corpus
linguistics analysis of a key term, which both the majority opinion and another concurrence
discussed at some length. Utah v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1264-66, 1271 (Utah 2015). 
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One clear difficulty with using corpus linguistics in statutory
interpretation is its uncertain place within the legal landscape.84
Like any social science, corpus linguistics speaks in terms of trends
and tendencies, resisting the definitive, decisive, and exclusive re-
sults favored by the adversarial system.85 Usually, such evidence is
presented by expert witnesses, or addressed by amicus briefs.86 In
contrast, at least one judge has undertaken his own corpus linguis-
tic analysis in his opinions.87
Does the empirical analysis of language use for statutory inter-
pretation differ from other kinds of empirical inquiry? We would not
expect, for instance, the Justices in Chapman v. United States to do
their own chemical analysis of LSD,88 or the Justices deciding Ra-
panos v. United States to perform hydrological studies.89 The idea
that judges should do their own empirical investigation of language
use seems to rest on an assumption that language patterns are
pretty easy to figure out and generally available to competent
speakers—an assumption very similar to the criticism of judicial
intuitions that has prompted the promotion of corpus linguistics to
begin with.
Or perhaps since statutory meaning is the traditional province of
the judiciary, determining what a word means in a statute differs
fundamentally from determining how easy it is to separate LSD
from its carrier. That certainly comports with the American tra-
dition of common law style interpretation of statutes. But it is hard
to square with claims stating that statutory interpreters should use
corpus linguistics because it provides an objective—that is, a non-
judicial—understanding of the empirical realities of language. If
judges have particular authority over statutory language of a sort
that they do not have over other empirical facts, then outsourcing
decision-making to a data set would seem to defeat it. And if judges
84. See supra notes 81-83.
85. See generally THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW (Elizabeth Mertz ed., 2008)
(collecting articles that explore the troubled relationship between social science research and
legal discourse and process).
86. See Ronald Roesch et al., Social Science and the Courts, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1-2
(1991).
87. See, e.g., Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1274-76 (Lee, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
88. See 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991).
89. See generally 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
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are supposed to figure out empirical facts about language use rather
than use their particular authority, then it is hard to distinguish
that kind of empiricism from empiricism regarding drug composition
and water flow.
As Carissa Byrne Hessick has argued, the sticking point seems to
be the issue of judgment.90 The corpus may contain objective, em-
pirical data, but any analysis of that data requires people to make
decisions.91 Most basically, they must choose which words, and
combinations of words, to search for. Even such seemingly simple
choices can make a big difference. In the Muscarello situation,
searching for all instances of “carry” yields a different result than
searching for all instances of “carry” combined with “vehicle.”92
What it means to “harbor” an undocumented alien may look dif-
ferent if we search only references to people harboring other people,
as opposed to harboring feelings and other intangible things.93 How
should a judge decide which to use?
Moreover, decisions are not limited to word choice. Corpora may
include naturally occurring conversations, popular publications, spe-
cialized publications, and other contents. How should a judge decide
which combination provides the best evidence of the relevant lan-
guage use? Some corpora include information about the pragmatic
90. See generally Corpus Linguistics, supra note 82.
91. See id. at 1519 (noting the “centrality of human decision making in corpus linguistics
analysis”).
92. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998).
93. Corpus Linguistics, supra note 82, at 1519-21 (discussing United States v. Costello,
666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012)). In Costello, Judge Posner searched Google for references to
people harboring other people. Id. at 1520. Scholars criticized that choice because it failed to
include the harboring of intangible objects. Id. The fact that there are options to decide
between demonstrates that the key steps in a corpus analysis—deciding how to do a search
and how to interpret it—depend on human judgment, not on the empirical data set. See id.
at 1520-21. Although only a couple of judicial opinions have attempted corpus linguistic
anlaysis, judges have already managed to reach “precisely opposite conclusions about the
‘ordinary meaning’ of a statutory term based on the same corpus data.” Carissa Byrne
Hessick, More on Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 11, 2017,
1:01 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/09/more-on-corpus-linguistics-and-
the-criminal-law.html [https://perma.cc/RP5H-2JDQ] (discussing People v. Harris, 885
N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2016)). In People v. Harris, the majority concluded that a major corpus of
American usage showed that the term “information” included both truthful and false
assertions. People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 840 (Mich. 2016). The dissent reached the
opposite conclusion using the same corpus. See id. at 845 (Markman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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context in which language use took place. The same term or phrase,
of course, can mean different things depending on that context.94
We might agree that the semantic definition of water includes its
being wet, but the assertion that “water is wet” can mean different
things in different situations. Given as an answer to a chemistry
teacher’s question, the assertion may receive a reprimand. Spoken
by a grandfather to his grandchild at the beach, it might instead
elicit giggles. The semantic quality of the utterance, so seemingly
transparent in isolation, turns out to depend on the social relations,
genres of appropriate conduct, and other circumstances that sur-
round its occurrence.
Thus, whether a conversation takes place at a dinner table or in
a classroom, in a forest or on a city street, can affect how people
speak, since different situations may be characterized by different
usages. How should this figure into a legal determination? Should
we look for corpus data that occurs in situations that seem relevant
to a particular statutory determination? What might those be, and
how should we decide? Should we exclude media sources such as
newspapers from the data set because they present edited utter-
ances with no information about the context in which they were
produced or understood? Or should we instead rely on them because
they are so broadly read?
These questions are difficult, but they are just the beginning.
Using corpus linguistics responsibly—rather than as a cover—would
require judges to make the kinds of difficult decisions this Part
shows them avoiding. For one thing, they would have to decide what
they meant by ordinary meaning. As others have noted, opinions
use the term “ordinary meaning” to refer to a range of things.95 It
may refer to any meaning that is allowable—that people would
recognize and respond to appropriately—or it may indicate an
“exclusive” meaning that rules out others.96 It may refer to a usage
94. See, e.g., Michael Silverstein, Cognitive Implications of a Referential Hierarchy, in
SOCIAL AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 125, 129-30 (Maya
Hickmann ed., 1987) (arguing that reference and predication “is a special case” of the
“semiotic-functional” aspect of language use, which involves pragmatic situation of language
use as “a form of social action, a meaning-dependent and meaning-generating activity”).
95. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 81, at 796-98.
96. Id. at 800-01.
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that is “common,” or even the “most frequent” one.97 Alternatively,
ordinariness may be a measure of the “prototypical” meanings that
set the terms for normal and outlier versions of a particular ex-
pression.98 Or it may refer to what most speakers would say a term
meant most of the time, even if they were, statistically speaking,
wrong—something like popular opinion about prototypicality. There
is so little consensus on what ordinary meaning is that judges some-
times invoke different understandings of ordinariness within the
same opinion.99
For an empirical methodology to help organize judicial decision-
making, judges would need to settle on some hierarchy among those
uses. That hierarchy, in turn, would require some normative justif-
ication. Arguments from democratic accountability can support each
of the understandings judges display.100 It is well established, for
instance, that native speakers generally have weak intuitions about
the frequency with which particular words are used, or the fre-
quency with which a word is used in some particular way as opposed
to some other.101 This weakness is reminiscent of, and may be re-
lated to, broader psychological tendencies: people often overrate the
frequency or likelihood of notable, unpleasant, and recent occur-
rences.102 People also tend to be more attentive to some linguistic
functions than others. Speakers tend to be more aware of those
aspects of language that refer to, and make assertions about, objects
in the world. They are generally less aware of structuring aspects of
language, such as syntax. And they are even less conscious of the
systematic effects language has on social relations and on the
meaning-making process.103
To give a simple example, when hearing a statement such as
“that chocolate is delicious,” listeners would generally be likely to
97. Id.
98. Id. at 801-02.
99. See id. at 803-04 (noting that the Muscarello majority implies that ordinary meaning
is determined by most frequent meaning at some points, but by common meaning at others,
while the dissent uses the notion both as possible or acceptable and as most frequent
meaning). 
100. See infra note 101-03 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 66-72.
102. See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982) (collecting articles).
103. See Silverstein, supra note 73, at 382. 
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notice the noun “chocolate” and the predication about its quality.
They would generally be less attentive to the way the deictic “that”
assumes, and thereby constructs, joint attention on an object by
speaker and addressee.104 Similarly, speakers may tend to be more
aware of the word “that” used in this deictic sense, to point to an
object in the world, but neglect its more structural role in phrases
such as “I think that” or “he said that,” irrespective of which usage
occurs more frequently. In this sense, simple statistical frequency
may indicate one form of ordinariness, yet not express what most
people think a word means most of the time. Pragmatically, “that
chocolate is delicious” might be an expression of gratitude, an offer,
or a suggestion, depending on whether one is guest, host, or co-
shopper.
In sum, what counts as the relevant kind of ordinary language for
purposes of legal interpretation is not at all clear. It is not even
clear whether “ordinary” should always mean the same thing.
Corpus linguistics can hardly help judges figure out what ordinary
language is if the concept of ordinariness itself is up for grabs.
And the decisions do not stop there. Using corpus linguistics
responsibly would further require judges to decide on relevant
groups of language users. As the preceding section implied, though,
determining what makes a speech community relevant can be dif-
ficult. Think back to Muscarello105 and the King James Bible.106 Why
does it seem relatively obvious that the seventeenth century Britons
who produced the King James Bible do not form a relevant speech
community for assessing ordinary American language in the 1960s?
Well, those seventeenth-century translators are not affected by the
statute and do not form an audience for it—we cannot say that the
statute ever addressed them in any meaningful way. They had, and
could have, no role in electing those who enacted the statute, nor, of
course, did they enact it themselves.
Working through what makes a speech community irrelevant
illuminates some versions of relevance that judges would need to
104. See, e.g., Bernard Weissbourd & Elizabeth Mertz, Rule-Centrism Versus Legal
Creativity: The Skewing of Legal Ideology Through Language, 19 L. & SOC’Y REV. 623, 626-27
(1985).
105. See generally Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
106. See generally KING JAMES BIBLE.
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choose among. One option: the relevant speech community could be
the one directly affected or addressed by the statute. For instance,
Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Taniguchi, written for six Jus-
tices, left off the imaginary corpus discussed at oral argument and
instead looked to the “relevant professional literature” addressed to
translators and interpreters.107
But are professional translators and interpreters the relevant
communicative community? The fee-shifting statute, after all, was
about translators and interpreters, but it regulated the conduct of
judges: legal professionals who were not addressed by the technical
literature the majority cited.108 A dog ordinance may be about dogs,
but we would not look to dogs to define it. Deciding which commu-
nity matters can be contentious.
The Taniguchi majority suggests that the relevant speech com-
munity for statutory interpretation is not the one whose conduct is
regulated by the law, but the one that suffers the law’s practical ef-
fects.109 If that is the case, though, then judges might consider other
candidates for affected speech communities. It is well known, for
instance, that African Americans are dramatically overrepresented
in drug arrests, convictions, and incarceration, “[r]elative to their
numbers in [both] the general population and among drug offend-
ers.”110 African Americans are thus particularly affected by drug-
related criminal and sentencing statutes, kind of like interpreters
were particularly affected by the fee-shifting statute in Taniguchi.111
African Americans are also more likely to speak African American
Vernacular English than members of other racialized groups,112
107. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 571 (2012).
108. Id. at 576-77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109. See generally id.
110. Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 257, 257 (2009). In 2012, “more black inmates were sentenced for drug offenses
than inmates of other races or Hispanic origin.” E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI,
PRISONERS IN 2012—ADVANCE COUNTS 11 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12ac.
pdf) [https://perma.cc/22JJ-VKVD]. However, African Americans comprised only around 13.6
percent of the total population. SONYA RASTOGI ET AL., THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010 3 (2011),
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD2J-3BK2].
111. See generally Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012).
112. See, e.g., JOHN R. RICKFORD, AFRICAN AMERICAN VERNACULAR ENGLISH: FEATURES,
EVOLUTION, EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 129-30 (1999).
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kind of like interpreters are more likely to employ the technical ter-
minology of interpretation than other professional groups. 
The Taniguchi majority’s approach would thus suggest that
judges should interpret drug-related criminal statutes with refer-
ence to African American Vernacular English. That may seem
absurd. But why is it more absurd than interpreting an attorney
fee-shifting statute with reference to the technical terminology of
interpreters? As with Bourdieu’s mayor, it may only seem strange
against the “tacitly recognize[d] ... unwritten law” that white-collar
professionals have a higher status in court than drug-crime
defendant speakers of African American Vernacular English.113
Additionally, a given statute can affect and address multiple com-
munities. Many, if not most, statutes address the conduct of ad-
ministrative agencies.114 The Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud
and Abuse Prevention Act does not itself regulate telemarketers; it
instructs the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to promulgate rules
“prohibiting deceptive ... and ... abusive telemarketing acts.”115 The
agency’s rules and standards then affect private parties. Which is
the relevant speech community, FTC employees or telemarketers?116
Under the Chevron doctrine, an agency’s reasonable usage holds if
the term is multivalent.117 But which speech community should
judges look to when determining whether a term is multivalent? If
we see agencies as part of the law-making apparatus that imposes
strictures on private parties, it may make sense to ask how private
parties understand the statutory terms. But if we see agencies as a
separate part of government whose own conduct is regulated by the
statutory command to formulate rules, it may make more sense to
ask how administrators would use a statutory term.
113. BOURDIEU, supra note 2, at 68.
114. Cf. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN
OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE FEDERAL
REGISTER 2 (2016).
115. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-297,
§ 3(a)(1), 108 Stat. 1545, 1545 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6102 (2012)).
116. See, e.g., Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and Statutory
Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV. 431, 433 (2001) (arguing that statutory interpreters should
modify their approach depending on the kind of audience a statute addresses).
117. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984); see
also Anya Bernstein, Differentiating Deference, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5-6 (2016).
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Agencies also often participate in drafting statutes addressing
the agencies themselves.118 As Jarrod Shobe’s research shows,
agency personnel often care a lot about the terminology of the stat-
utes they implement: “each agency has its own terms of art that
have very specific meanings to the agency,”119 and agency employees
strive to ensure that the congressional staffers who draft statutes
use them appropriately.120 As an interviewee told Shobe, “[w]e have
a whole language relevant to our agency’s statutes.... We use those
terms consistently across time. We are very concerned about that
and monitor it closely” when advising Congress on legislation.121
Moreover, the same terms “frequently have very different meanings
across agencies,” and even across components of the same depart-
ment.122 How should a judge incorporate these realities into a corpus
search? Should corpus inquiries exclude popular media and other
nonspecialized content, focusing instead on usage within the ad-
ministrative state?
In short, if judges want to base interpretation on empirical indicia
of ordinary language, they need to decide what empirical indicia to
look for, what they mean by “ordinary,” and which speech commu-
nity counts. The answers are often not obvious. They always imply
a normative stand.123 An empirically robust approach to alleviating
the indeterminacy of linguistic meaning may look attractive, but it
cannot resolve the essentially normative issues it raises: what kinds
of meaning, and what kinds of speakers, matter?124
118. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PENN. L. REV.
1377, 1378-79, 1382 (2017); Christopher J. Walker, Lawmaking Within Federal Agencies and
Without Judicial Review, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 551, 552, 557-59 (2017); Christopher J.
Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1012 (2015).
119. Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies in
the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 518 (2017).
120. Id. at 518-20.
121. Id. at 518-19 (footnote omitted).
122. Id. at 519.
123. See supra Part II.B.1.
124. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, We Are All Translators Now: Constitutional Analysis as
Translation, 28 COMP. LEGILINGUISTICS 7, 17 (2016), https://pressto.amu.edu.pl/index.php/cl/
article/view/7430/7463 [https://perma.cc/S664-89YR] (“The corpus ... can ... provide distribu-
tional information about word usage.... It cannot tell the legal analyst what to do with that
information.” (citation omitted)).
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2. Ordinary Versus Statutory
Perhaps we could avoid some of these difficulties by looking on
average, to the entire society that statutes rule. This would throw
some current judicial practices into doubt: it would put Taniguchi’s
concern with subnational speech communities off limits and pre-
clude using the OED’s British-English entries to convene supra-
national ones.125 But it would have the benefit of justifying judges’
reluctance to make other group distinctions. One could posit that a
widely recognized standard speech pattern should serve as the ref-
erence point for interpreting statutes that apply nationwide.
Opinions that draw on national-level publications to discern ordi-
nary speech, for example, comport with this approach. Yet this
choice raises its own empirical and normative questions. After all,
statutory language is not representative of, or even similar to, the
statistically frequent language patterns that can be derived from
the corpora of naturally occurring conversations, popular publica-
tions, and so on. On the contrary, it is strikingly unusual in its se-
mantics, syntax, and pragmatics.
Semantically, statutes create terminology all the time, not
through naturally occurring variation and gradual uptake, but by
fiat. They are full of speech acts that declare things such as, from
now on, a state-based marketplace for private insurance coverage
will be called an “American Health Benefit Exchange,” or “Ex-
change” for short.126 Ordinary language—in the sense of statistically
frequent patterns found in the kinds of sources corpus linguistics
uses—would give no reason to think that in 2010, “Exchange” meant
a health insurance marketplace. And no ordinary speaker would
have the power to create such a meaning out of whole cloth. Yet,
there it is.
Even when statutes do not invent terminology, they are inter-
textually enmeshed in wider webs of legal terms that are them-
selves far from ordinary. For instance, the doctrine of res judicata
prohibits relitigating the “same” claim, but “same” includes quite
distinct claims that could and should have been brought in the first
125. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 568-71 (2012).
126. See American Health Benefit Exchanges, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012).
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litigation.127 It prohibits relitigating an issue that has been deter-
mined in a final judgment on the merits, but that includes resolu-
tions that lack final judgments on the merits, such as dismissals for
failure to state a claim.128
This might seem like a simple problem to solve: everyone agrees
that specialized legal terminology should form part of the data set
through which statutory meaning is interpreted. However, it is not
as simple as it seems. There is no consensus on how to determine
when a word is just a word, and when it is a legal term of art. The
technical legal meaning of “lawful presence” in immigration law
may be something like temporary authorization to stay in the
United States even in the absence of a legal right, but a judge still
has to decide whether to read it that way or instead choose the less
technical interpretation of having a legal right to stay.129 The term
“take” might have a long common law history but also be defined in
the statute in which it appears. A judge must decide which to use.130
Syntactically, of course, statutes are nothing short of bizarre.
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is
otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision
of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punish-
ment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon
or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States, uses or carries a firearm ... shall ... be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.131
Could you say that at a cocktail party without “people look[ing] at
you funny”?132 And this—the provision at issue in Muscarello—is a
comparatively simple example, with no cross-references or highly
127. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
128. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2002).
129. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 622-23 (discussing the Supreme Court oral argument
in United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam)).
130. See id. at 574-78, 596-98 (discussing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a
Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995)).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
132. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
acid test of whether a word can reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether you could
use the word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you funny.”). 
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technical terms.133 Statutes are so highly nonordinary that they are
famous for being impossible to read. Even legislators read section
summaries to help them decipher statutory text.134 Using corpus
lingusitics, judges would use statistically frequent speech patterns
to interpret utterances that are universally acknowledged not to
employ statistically frequent speech patterns.
Pragmatically, statutes are, if anything, even more exceptional.
Performative utterances—those that create the state of affairs they
describe—are common in everyday life, but statutes take perform-
ativity to a whole new level. They constantly create new states of
affairs simply by being enacted. We do not usually have vociferous
national debates about the appropriate posture for listening to
someone sing, but once a statute makes the Star Spangled Banner
the national anthem,135 that kind of debate makes more sense. The
world has changed because a statute says it has. Statutes’ prag-
matic effects are thus heightened from those of ordinary speech.
Further, the way statutes are produced—the pragmatic condi-
tions for their existence—is not just unusual, it is not even remotely
similar to any process that yields statistically frequent speech. What
ordinary utterance requires the majority vote of two multimember
representative institutions, each with its own complicated authori-
zation structures and rules for producing such texts, plus the
agreement of a nationally elected executive officer?136
From an empirical perspective, statistically frequent speech pat-
terns give quite limited information about highly extraordinary
speech. And from a normative perspective, it is not clear how im-
puting unrelated speech habits to statutory utterances furthers the
values of representative democracy. It’s almost as strange as using
the King James Bible.
In the end, the speech community that judicial opinions usually
rely on turns out to be, roughly, a community of “speakers like us”:
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
134. See Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism:
The CBO Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can Improve on What They Are Already Trying
to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 209 (2017) (“[O]ne of the most important pieces of legislative
history to most congressional insiders and legislation experts is the ‘section-by-section’
summary that accompanies most statutes.... [S]easoned statutory players start with the
[summary] ... before turning to ... the statutory text.”).
135. 36 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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people who read classic literary works and national newspapers,
who find specialized jargon more legitimate than the argot of the
less educated or less powerful, who consult the OED when in doubt.
On this reading, some of the weirder quotations I have discussed
may make more sense. The King James Bible and Jane Austen do
not present speakers who are relevant to statutory interpretation,
but they are read by the kind of readers who are: the highly ed-
ucated, well-read, relatively formal speakers we would expect to
occupy the federal bench.
References to ordinary language may be meant to overcome fears
of countermajoritarian usurpation and return interpretive authority
to the hands of the people. Nonetheless, they turn out to capture the
ordinary language intuitions of judges—not the statistically fre-
quent patterns of statistically frequent speech. Appearing to hand
power over to ordinary people, this approach sneakily reroutes that
power right back to judges themselves.
One may view judges as quite properly involved in democratic
lawmaking. As I discuss in Part V, this view is implicit in the com-
mon law model of adjudication, and forms part of the Anglo-Amer-
ican legal tradition. On this view, factors such as the formalized and
deliberative processes of adjudication; the requirement of reason-
giving; and the ongoing development of legal interpretations over
time by a range of people in a range of situations all bring in the
kind of participation and openness that legitimizes judges’ in-
terpretation of law.137 There may, in other words, be good reasons
for judges interpreting statutory terms to turn to speakers like
themselves. But instead of explaining and defending judges’ role in
the interpretive process, the outsourcing I describe obscures it by
pretending to rely on others. The result: outsourcing that magnani-
mously hands power to those who already hold it.
137. Matthew Steilen, On the Place of Judge-Made Law in a Government of Laws, 3
CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 243, 259-60 (2016) (“[A]t least some eighteenth-century Americans
thought of judge-made law ... [as] essential to republican government” because the “solemn
proceedings” of “forensic litigation” made it “possible for a community in court to freely give
the law to itself” in a reasoned way removed from the arbitrariness or self-interest of
legislative politics); see also David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996) (“The common law approach restrains judges.”). See generally
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2013) (describing how legal
understandings in different areas of law change over the course of a series of cases decided
over many years).
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III. METHOD CONTRA THEORY
The preceding Part describes an outsourcing approach that cuts
across Supreme Court Justices and does not seem to be associated
with any particular theoretical orientation. A related kind of out-
sourcing, though, is closely connected to textualism, which asks
judges to interpret statutory terms as a reasonable reader would.138
That appears to locate meaning-making power not in the judge but
in the interaction between the legislature and its audience. But tex-
tualism then declines to let either legislatures or audiences speak
for themselves. Instead, it leaves the judge to speak for both.
Textualism thus presents an aspiration to diminish judicial power
along with a technique that bolsters it.
For Justice Scalia, textualism’s most prominent exponent, the
legitimacy of judicial interpretation depended on restraining judi-
cial discretion.139 As John Manning, another prominent proponent,
has explained, Justice Scalia saw the judicial role as vitally circum-
scribed by the way “our system ... makes the democratically account-
able branches primarily responsible for lawmaking.”140 Statutory
interpretation theory had to respond to the likelihood that judges
would “make an end run around the democratic process by exercis-
ing common law discretion ‘to make the law.’”141 Judicial legitimacy
rested on the restriction of judicial power: Justice Scalia’s “anti-
discretion principle was an independent value that swept more
broadly than his core commitments to” any particular interpretive
approach.142
138. See, e.g., In re Estate of Whittington, 409 S.W.3d 666, 670 (Tex. App. 2013).
139. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 17-18 (1997).
140. John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L. REV.
747, 748 (2017).
141. Id. (quoting SCALIA, supra note 139, at 6, 10).
142. Id. at 750. Strikingly, Manning concedes that this underlying justification for
textualism itself has no textual basis. See id. (“[E]ven though Justice Scalia’s anti-discretion
principle is ultimately a theory of judicial power, he does not focus his justification upon any
... detailed account of Article III’s original understanding.”); see also id. at 755 (“Justice
Scalia’s anti-discretion principle did not necessarily derive from his interpretation of a
particular governing text.”). You might think that the wholly discretionary creation of a
discretion-limiting principle might throw the entire enterprise in doubt, but it doesn’t seem
to bother Manning any more than it did Justice Scalia. See generally id.
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In keeping with that antidiscretionary ethos, textualism requires
judges to “ground decisions in some form of constraint external to
the judges’ own preferences.”143 For textualists, this distinguishes
the modern judge who interprets statutes from “the common law
judge[ ],” whose “job is really that of ‘playing king—devising, out of
the brilliance of one’s own mind, those laws that ought to govern.’”144
Here, I first take a closer look at how this purported constraint
works, then consider what it might mean to play king in a democ-
racy.
A. Who Speaks for the People?
How does textualism express its antidiscretion principle? A judge
stays faithful to the law-making process by focusing closely on the
statute’s text—the only thing enacted into law. Asking what leg-
islators understood the statute to accomplish or mean might allow
views that were not enacted as law to determine interpretation, in
a kind of ultra vires legislation.145 Plus, the judge could disturb
legislative “deals,” the quiet compromises legislators made negotiat-
ing the statute, which result in the finished product but might not
be clear from records of the enactment process.146
Congress, here, is a speaker who speaks once per statute: its voice
crystalized in the text, it can offer no metalinguistic gloss on it.
Sources specific to the enactment process are thus not legitimate
guides to statutory text for textualist interpretation.
143. Id. at 750. 
144. Id. at 751 (quoting SCALIA, supra note 139, at 7 (1997)).
145. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 82 (2017) (“Intents are irrelevant even if discernable ... because our
Constitution provides for the enactment and approval of texts, not of intents.”). 
146. For instance, statutory provisions “may reflect unrecorded compromises among
interest groups, unknowable strategic behavior, or even an implicit legislative decision to
forgo costly bargaining over greater textual precision,” that textualists are loathe to probe or
disturb. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003).
Because these details will often not be available to a judge, “[t]extualists ... believe that the
only safe course for a faithful agent is to enforce the clear terms of the statutes that have
emerged from that process.” Id.; see also Manning, supra note 140, at 756 (“Justice Scalia
contested [purposivism] primarily on the legislative process ground that if a judge elevates
a statute’s purpose over its enacted text, he or she might unknowingly disrupt awkward,
behind-the-scenes compromises ... essential to the law’s enactment.”).
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Instead of looking to the particular people who produced the
statutory utterance, textualists talk about the general populace that
comprises its audience. “Textualists give primacy to ... evidence
about the way a reasonable person conversant with relevant social
and linguistic practices would have used the words,” wrote Man-
ning.147 “[W]ords mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at
the time they were written,”148 agreed Justice Scalia, insofar as they
fit in the context of the “corpus juris,” the background of law against
which any statute is enacted.149 Judge Frank Easterbrook, another
textualist adherent, agrees: “the significance of an expression de-
pends on how the interpretive community alive at the time of the
text’s adoption understood those words.”150 For textualists, interpre-
tation is grounded in audience understanding.
Textualism thus lays claim to a legitimacy based in popular
support: it seeks to base its interpretations of statutory text in the
ways that ordinary people would realistically have read them. But
just who are these “reasonable [people] conversant with relevant
social and linguistic practices”?151 In keeping with its preference for
generality over specificity, textualism never specifies a particular
community. How, then, can a judge ascertain how a reasonable au-
dience would have understood a text? Textualism never says.
One might explain this reticence by noting that textualism seeks
not the specific understandings of some specific people, but the
general—what is sometimes called “objective”—understanding that
reasonable people would have. Fair enough; American law fre-
quently uses the figment of the reasonable person. Yet, when judges
consider how a reasonable person would have acted, say, under
some circumstances that gave rise to a tort suit, we ask them to
implicitly apply their sense of societal norms about what constitutes
147. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 91 (2006).
148. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 16 (2012).
149. See SCALIA, supra note 139, at 17; see also Manning, supra note 147, at 90-91 (arguing
that textualists should look to a term’s “semantic content”). See generally Solan, supra note
80, at 2053 (explaining that, for evidence about the meanings of unclear terms, textualists
eschew pronouncements by those who wrote and voted on the terms and consider instead
what those terms mean to idiomatic speakers).
150. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, at xxv (2012).
151. Manning, supra note 147, at 91.
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reasonable behavior under those circumstances. But say it is 2018
and a judge is interpreting a statute written in 1934. Where would
a judge get a sense of the societal, or linguistic, norms of 1934? Even
for a general, objective take on reasonable audience understanding,
interpreters need some information about how some reasonable
people understood things at some particular time. As with language
use, it is impossible to find—or even look for—reasonable under-
standing without choosing some community whose understanding
to use as a guide.152
Taking a position on how reasonable people at some time would
have understood a term requires inquiring into how some reason-
able people used and understood linguistic utterances at that time.
Otherwise, interpretation becomes a matter of imaginative recon-
struction: the judge must conjure the spirit, not of Congress, but of
an entire society at the time of the statute’s enactment. Textual-
ism’s reliance on reasonable understandings of statutory text thus
suggests a fairly empirical methodology. Yet in practice, textualism
offers anything but.
Rather than undertaking empirical inquiry, textualism instead
restricts access to the kind of evidence that might indicate ordinary
understandings within any community. It allows judges to use only
a very limited array of sources, none of which convey information
about how any given community might understand a statute.
For instance, textualists tend to like canons of statutory inter-
pretation.153 But canons offer instructions about how people should
interpret, not evidence of how people do interpret.154 Although a
canon might help pin down a statutory meaning by force, it can
hardly reveal how competent speakers would understand the
statute.155
152. In addition, textualists argue that, as a multi-member body, Congress cannot have a
shared purpose. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent
as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992). Nevertheless, textualists ascribe a
unitary understanding to the audience of competent English speakers—an even more multi-
member “they.”
153. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 148 (offering fifty-seven canons that the
authors consider useful for understanding constitutions, statutes, regulations, and contracts,
and thirteen more that they deride as “falsities”).
154. See infra Part IV (noting that canons do not represent ordinary patterns of com-
munication).
155. Of course, whether a canon can pin down a meaning has been a matter of hot debate
for a hundred years. See infra Part IV. The point here is that, even if it can, that does not tell
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Textualists also countenance dictionaries.156 But, as Part II ex-
plained, dictionaries vary greatly in the kind of evidence they pro-
vide about how people understand utterances. Indeed, that question
has never been the primary focus of most dictionaries, which are
more concerned with how speakers speak than with how addressees
understand them. Lexicographers who write dictionaries, moreover,
are not held to any particular research method.157
In any event, judges pay scant attention to discussions of dic-
tionary methods when they are available. Textualists, moreover,
sometimes argue for dictionaries that instruct people on how they
ought to speak rather than those that strive to describe how people
actually speak.158 Reliance on the linguistic preferences of lexicogra-
phers simply cannot provide the kind of certainty textualists seek
about how broad audiences would understand a term.
Textualists also turn to the common law and other legal sources
for help interpreting a statutory term. Legal provisions are surely
relevant to the interpretation of law. Yet textualism gives adherents
little guidance about how to use them and no way to choose among
the audiences they implicate. Should a judge look only to other pro-
visions within the statute, or venture outside it? If she goes outside
the statute, what kinds of sources should she consult—the common
law, other statutes, administrative regulations?159 What era should
she focus on—the time of the statute’s enactment, that preceding it,
or that following it? Should, for instance, the way audiences un-
derstood a common-law term in the nineteenth century determine
our interpretation of a twentieth-century statute? And if so, how do
we treat the twentieth-century audience, which may have aban-
doned the nineteenth-century terminology?160 Each choice implicates
textualists how a statute’s audience would understand a term.
156. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
157. Lexicographers may sometimes not be subject to much oversight, either. An “eminent
former editor of the Oxford English Dictionary” has been accused of purging the dictionary
of English words with foreign origins. See Alison Flood, Former OED Editor Covertly Deleted
Thousands of Words, Book Claims, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2012, 3:17 PM), https://www.the
guardian.com/books/2012/nov/26/former-oed-editor-deleted-words [https://perma.cc/7JUE-
QYZ7] (detailing Sarah Ogilvie’s claim that Robert Burchfield “deleted 17% of the ‘loanwords’
and world English words that had been included by” his predecessor).
158. See supra Part II.A.
159. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 607-09 (discussing opinions in Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)).
160. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577-78, 596-98, 601-02.
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different groups of reasonable people conversant with law and lan-
guage. With no method for selecting among its options, the corpus
juris offers a wide field of play, a crowd from which interpreters can
pick out their friends.161
Textualism also does not tell judges when to treat a term as a
specialized legal term addressed to a specialized legal audience, as
opposed to an ordinary language term addressed to all competent
speakers (of whatever time or place).162 A judge potentially con-
strained by a technical legal meaning thus still has the option of
treating the term as merely ordinary language.163
Some formalists even think that “ordinary citizens confronted
with ‘technical’ language ... defer to the understanding ... that would
be ... available ... to ... the relevant group” of experts, such that a
layperson faced with a legal term will just “ask a lawyer.”164 So
judges are to interpret a legal term the way an ordinary speaker
would understand it, if the ordinary speaker interpreted the term
by asking someone like the judge what it meant.165 And that is
supposed to impose constraint on judicial interpretation.166
Beyond these, textualism’s sources are limited. The repertoire
does not include studies or other indications of how nonjudicial
audiences understand a particular term (though textualist judges,
like others, do use others’ language use in an ad hoc way, as
161. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (“It sometimes seems that citing
legislative history is still, as my late colleague Harold Leventhal once observed, akin to
‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’”). For an extended discussion of the wide
range of options offered by the corpus juris, see generally Bernstein, supra note 9.
162. See Manning, supra note 147, at 78, 81-82.
163. See supra Part II.B.1.
164. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, 107 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 25 (2008). Solum cites Hilary Putnam’s “division of linguistic
labor” to suggest that “[w]hen members of the general public encounter a [legal] term of art,
their understanding of its meaning involves a process of deferral” to legal professionals. Id.
Putnam’s theory, though, recognized that specialized terms might have ordinary meanings
among lay speakers, leading to the division of linguistic labor, rather than mere deferral.
Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of “Meaning,” in 7 MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 131, 144 (Keith Gunderson ed., 1975). The chemical definition of “gold” might be in
the hands of experts, but that does not prevent ordinary speakers from using the term, and
successfully meaning something by it, in everyday speech. See id. In law as in metallurgy, the
choice between treating a term as technical and treating it as ordinary is not quite as simple
as Solum suggests. See generally id.
165. See Solum, supra note 164, at 25.
166. See id. at 23-24.
472 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:435
described in Part II).167 Textualism thus instructs judges to inter-
pret statutory text as a broad audience of English speakers would,
but also asks judges to use only sources that provide little infor-
mation on that topic.
Instead, textualism leaves it to the judge. In its image of legal
communication, statutory text speaks to an audience, but because
the audience cannot speak for itself, the judge must speak for it.
Confronting the many definitions offered by dictionaries, the judge
chooses the definition she thinks is best.168 Given the different ways
a term can be used, the judge chooses the one that sounds most idio-
matic to her.169 To demonstrate why her choices make sense, a judge
chooses quotations from books she likes.170 To demonstrate the nor-
mative desirability of her choices, the judge serves herself from the
interpretive canon buffet.171
There may be good reasons for taking this approach. Judges are,
generally, experienced professionals trained in legal reasoning and
interpretation. Federal judges usually go through an intense vetting
process.172 State judges may be elected by the people whose contro-
versies they adjudicate.173 We may, in other words, trust or require
judges to expound the understandings of a people they imagine,
treating them as legitimate participants in the production of legal
strictures.174
But that is not the view textualism promotes. Textualism claims
to restrain judicial discretion, to make judges defer to the under-
standings of others. But it then rules out sources of meaning that
might challenge a judge’s intuitions or preferences. The judge in-
terprets according to the understandings of a statute’s audience—
which only the judge is authorized to assert.
167. See supra Part II.
168. See supra Part II.
169. See supra Part II.
170. See supra Part II.
171. See infra Part IV.
172. See generally DENNIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43762, THE APPOINT-
MENT PROCESS FOR U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS: AN OVERVIEW (2016).
173. See State-By-State Summary of Judicial Selection, USLEGAL (2016), https://courts.
uslegal.com/selection-of-judges/state-by-state-summary-of-judicial-selection/
[https://perma.cc/GMD8-DXY2].
174. See, e.g., Steilen, supra note 137, at 258-60; Strauss, supra note 137, at 877, 905, 925.
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Where a more exacting approach might ask judges to use their
judgment, but require them to explain their reasoning, textualism’s
hidden reliance on intuitions and preferences leaves little ground for
rational debate. That may be one reason that textualists can act im-
patient, even incredulous, in the face of disagreement and un-
certainty, even though disagreement and uncertainty are the stuff
courts are made of.175 By combining a theory that makes big em-
pirical claims with a technique that eschews empirical inputs, tex-
tualism bolsters, rather than limits, the judge’s interpretive power.
To prevent judges from “playing king,”176 it hands them the keys to
the castle.177
B. Who Plays the King?
If judges are not supposed to “play[ ] king,”178 who is? Is it Con-
gress, with its two houses, hundreds of members, and byzantine pro-
cedures for passing statutes ordered into byzantine categories?179
Is it the President, who can comment (or tweet) about a bill but
whose formal power over enactment is limited to deciding whether
to sign something Congress already voted on?180 Is it executive
175. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 916-17,
928, 937-38 (2016).
176. SCALIA, supra note 139, at 7. 
177. Strangely, even critics of textualism sometimes accept its claims of restraint, as
though aspirations sufficed to achieve goals. For instance, Abbe Gluck argues that one reason
even formalist judges do not abide by formalist dictates is that they want to retain power: “the
stakes of a formalist approach in terms of lost judicial power are unacceptably high for many
judges.” Gluck, supra note 134, at 183. I hope I have shown here that textualism actually
supports judicial power. But it does so at the cost of consistency. Its theory, aspirations, and
normative orientation are fundamentally at odds with its techniques and tenets. Textualists’
inability to consistently abide by textualist strictures thus does not indicate an individual
failing or a conflict between theoretical purity and practical power. It is, rather, a structural
feature: because the system itself is internally incoherent, textualists cannot avoid being in-
consistent.
178. SCALIA, supra note 139, at 7.
179. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN
THE U.S. CONGRESS 4-5 (5th ed. 2017); Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po,
Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1799-1800, 1803
(2015); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History
by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 91, 94-95 (2012) [hereinafter Decision Theory]; Victoria F.
Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55
B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1617-18 (2014) [hereinafter Elementary].
180. See Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens
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agencies, the primary implementers of modern statutes, whose
personnel often help draft statutes but have no formal say in their
passage?181 Is it the bicameralism-and-presentment process, maybe,
with its legislators, staffers, and agency personnel writing statutory
language revised by various groups both before and after each house
of Congress votes on the bill, plus the President who decides
whether to sign it?182 Is it that process plus the enduring life of the
statute over time, as it becomes interpreted and implemented by
agencies, courts, and other actors? If these phrasings seem convo-
luted, it is because the process is convoluted. There is no simple way
to pin it, and no clear king to pin it on.
Justice Scalia’s choice of metaphor may thus reveal more than
textualism’s aspiration to constrain judges. It also exemplifies the
theory’s underlying discomfort with the messiness of American law-
making. Because of course, in our hydra-headed system, no individ-
ual gets to “devis[e] ... th[e] laws.”183 Not even any one institution
does.184 Textualism’s image of lawmaking is clean: you either are
the law-giver, or you are not.185 There is no dispersion of power
within the sovereign, such that someone could participate in the
production of law without determining it.
Textualism’s slogan of democratically appropriate judicial re-
straint thus turns out to rest on a rather undemocratic image of law.
In contrast to this absolutist view of politics, the American system
of lawmaking is characterized by constant dispersion, differential
participation, and the lack of an ultimate determiner.186
This all-or-nothing view of the world echoes in other textualist
tendencies. Manning, for instance, writes that Justice Scalia’s “close
analysis of cases” uncovered the “nearly standardless discretion ...
Actions: What Is Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719, 722 (2012).
181. See Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies
in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 467-68, 470 (2017); Walker, supra note
118, at 1383-84, 1387.
182. Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 91.
183. SCALIA, supra note 139, at 7.
184. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 7 (outlining legal requirements for enacting federal statutes);
5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), (4) (2012) (defining an agency rule as, in part, a statement that “im-
plement[s], interpret[s], or prescribe[s] law or policy”). See generally SINCLAIR, supra note 179
(examining the complexity of statute enactment in the contemporary government).
185. See generally George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99
YALE L.J. 1297 (1990).
186. See supra note 184.
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in ... judicial doctrines” by showing that “familiar balancing tests
asked the Court to compare incommensurable values,” or to aggre-
gate “multiple unweighted and unranked factors—techniques that
allowed the Court to come out either way.”187 On this description, a
complex standard that can potentially “come out either way” creates
“nearly standardless discretion.”188
This makes sense if you think of a valid standard as something
that tolerates only one possible result. And that makes sense if you
think of constraint as all-or-nothing: either you are constrained
completely, or you are not constrained at all. “Take this path and no
other.” That standard would certainly constrain discretion (though
it might raise the question of why we have judges in the first place).
Yet there is a middle ground. Guidelines or parameters for mak-
ing decisions can influence decision-makers even though they do not
dictate a particular result.189 “Take a path your little brother can
handle” does not dictate a particular result, and potentially allows
for a number of different, correct choices. Yet it does offer a guide for
making decisions. That guidance is, to be sure, based on assump-
tions about the addressee’s background knowledge as well as,
crucially, her ability and willingness to exercise judgment. It is not
easily applicable by an automaton. But with the exercise of
187. Manning, supra note 140, at 754-55.
188. Id. Another textualist all-or-nothing: treating evidence of meaning drawn from the
enactment process as “illegitimate” because legislative history is “insufficient to constitute
legislation under our system of governance.” Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 91. On this
reasoning, congressional utterances are either law and therefore decisive, or not law and
therefore not legitimately relevant. See id. But no one who uses legislative history claims it
is the law. See, e.g., Decision Theory, supra note 179, at 80-85, 90-91. Rather, people use it to
get indications or clues about meaning. See, e.g., id. Textualists tend to ignore this distinction,
simply declining to discuss the possibility that Congress’s nonlegal utterances can be relevant
and not decisive—that Congress can participate in making meaning without determining it
completely. See id. This is a bit puzzling, actually, because textualists do find relevant other
evidence that is not law and not decisive, such as dictionaries. See Manning, supra note 140,
at 747 n.1. Indeed, Easterbrook himself seems puzzled by it: “[l]ike most other textualists, I
am willing to consult legislative history as a cue to linguistic usage, even though not as an
authoritative guide to meaning.” Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 91. It is not clear what
distinguishes this position from that of, say, nontextualists such as Justice Breyer or Judge
Katzmann, who also consult legislative history for clues rather than authoritative answers.
See, e.g., Solan, supra note 80, at 2050-52.
189. Indeed, that is usually what legal theorists mean by “standard,” as opposed to “rule.”
See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 652-55 (2014) (explaining
this distinction).
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knowledge-based judgment, you could “come out either way” and yet
not exercise “nearly standardless discretion.”190
In claiming to seek the one, true, nondiscretionary answer,
textualism actually relies on the judge’s discretion.191 Its internal
contradictions—the way its aspirations contradict its techniques—
may thus be related to its distaste for messiness in both lawmaking
and legal interpretation.192 Textualism purports to outsource mean-
ing making and democratically vest power in a nonjudicial audience,
but it authorizes only the judge to voice that imagined community’s
understandings.193
IV. CANON LAW: UNRULY RULES
The preceding Parts discuss how legal actors appear to outsource
interpretation to general publics. This Part turns to another out-
sourcing target: interpretive rules, or canons. Canons promise to
take interpretive decisions out of the judge’s hands, binding them
instead with preexisting, pre-validated rules made over time by
others.194 Rules thus seem to remove power from the individual
judge adjudicating a particular case right now and place them in
other, more democratically legitimate, hands: the legislature, or,
more often, a historically validated judicial tradition.195 But the
judge retains the power to choose which rule binds her in any given
case, and there are rules enough to get the judge to a number of
different conclusions.196 More importantly, because there is no prin-
ciple along which canons are, or can be, ranked, there is little but
discretion guiding the choice.197
Canons of interpretation have already received considerable
attention.198 Existing criticism suggests that the lack of an accepted
190. Manning, supra note 140, at 754-55.
191. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
192. See Manning, supra note 140, at 754-55; Decision Theory, supra note 179, at 80-81.
193. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
194. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodo-
logical Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1763 (2010).
195. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079, 1087 (2017).
196. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
197. See Gluck, supra note 194, at 1766.
198. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 196, at 401-06.
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hierarchy for the canons—a rule to determine which rule to
use—undermines canons’ ability to provide a reliable method for
interpretation.199 I first explain how this argument is relevant to
outsourcing interpretation, then suggest that the problem it points
to rests on an underlying conceptual lacuna: a lack of agreement—
or even discussion—about just what it is that a canon of interpreta-
tion is supposed to accomplish. Arbitrariness thus pervades the
canon system. There is no accepted method to determine which rule
to outsource to, and no agreed-upon work the rule is supposed to do.
Like the practices and theories discussed in the preceding Parts,
outsourcing to canons does not contrain, but merely obscures,
decisions made by judges.
A. Decision Rules for Interpretive Rules
It is no secret that the canons are rather a mess. Perhaps the
most famous formulation of the problem came decades ago in Karl
Llewellyn’s thrust-but-parry presentation: popular canons arranged
in a column facing equally popular canons that led to opposite
conclusions.200 Do not extend a statute in derogation of the common
law, but read remedial statutes broadly irrespective of the common
law;201 hold to previous constructions of particular terms, but pro-
vide new interpretations when the statute requires it,202 and so on.
The point was to show that a judge could—indeed, had to—choose
between equally legitimized, but different, ways to interpret a given
text.203 The rules could determine the outcome, of course. But which
rule to use was itself not rule-bound. Any option had to be “sold,
essentially,” through some other justification.204
Llewellyn’s presentation has been criticized for treating the rules
unfairly: presenting as canons some ideas that have not achieved
canonical status; presenting exceptions to a rule as though they
were contradictions of it; presenting as a canon something the critic
199. See Gluck, supra note 194, at 1766.
200. Llewellyn, supra note 196, at 401-06.
201. See id. at 401.
202. See id. at 403.
203. See id. at 401 (“When it comes to presenting a proposed construction in court ... the
accepted convention still, unhappily requires discussion as if only one single correct meaning
could exist.”).
204. Id. 
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does not think even qualifies as interpretation.205 Even so, the point
stands. Without a decision rule for choosing among rules, judges do
not, and cannot, use the rules “predictably.”206 And, as Abbe Gluck
has persuasively argued, there is no such decision rule, no generally
accepted “ranking” to order judges’ recourse to the many canons
available.207 Even as great a fan of rules, Justice Scalia has written
that “[e]ach [canon] may be overcome by the strength of differing
principles that point in other directions,” but given no indication of
what “strength” would look like or how a judge should assess it.208
So the choices judges make may not fall into Llewellyn’s neatly
packaged dyads. But just as Llewellyn argued, judges can, and often
must, choose which rules to apply—and that choice itself is not rule-
bound.209
One thing that might lend a rule strength would be a firm judicial
decision to favor it over all others. But in practice, at least federal
judges do not treat canons of interpretation as “precedential” in a
way that would make “the same interpretive rules ... apply to the
same questions from case to case.”210 Nor has the Supreme Court
ever insisted on, or even favored, such “methodological stare decis-
is.”211
205. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 148, at 59-60 (presenting the most common
objections to Llewellyn’s critique). 
206. Gluck, supra note 134, at 179.
207. Id.
208. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 148, at 59.
209. See Llewellyn, supra note 196, at 401.
210. Gluck, supra note 134, at 179.
211. Gluck, supra note 194, at 1754 (“Methodological stare decisis—the practice of giving
precedential effect to judicial statements about methodology—is generally absent from the
jurisprudence of mainstream federal statutory interpretation.”); see also Evan J. Criddle &
Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1576-77 (2014).
Indeed, even moves that seem to gesture in that direction turn out to avoid it. For instance,
the Chevron doctrine governs judicial review of agency statutory interpretation. See Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). Chevron seems to
present a kind of interpretive precedent. See id.; Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron
Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 609 (2014)
(arguing that Chevron represents a break with the main line of statutory interpretation
theory and practice in part because it is treated as precedential, “whereas the other canons
of statutory interpretation are not treated as precedent or ‘doctrine’ of any kind”). But courts
have been careful to present Chevron as governing a court’s evaluations of an agency’s
statutory interpretation, not as guiding the court’s own interpretive practices. See id. at 616-
18. Chevron’s second step asks courts to judge whether an agency’s interpretation is
reasonable, an assessment for which the court must use its own judgment—not some method
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Another option would be to have Congress legislate that choice.
Congress could, in principle, add to the Dictionary Act and the
“thousands of rules of construction scattered throughout the U.S.
Code” to create a full-fledged statutory law of statutory interpreta-
tion.212 So far, judges have generally rejected the notion that Con-
gress has the power to dictate rules of statutory interpretation,
treating “statutory interpretation doctrine as inherently ‘person-
al.’”213 In any event, despite the existence of numerous statute-spe-
cific rules of interpretation, Congress has yet to legislate how judges
should choose among canons of interpretation.214
Lacking rules, precedent, or statute, some commentators have
looked to the common law model. William Baude and Stephen Sachs
have argued that canons of interpretation “are best understood as
unwritten law.”215 On this view, canons provide an example of a
more general phenomenon. Every law is intertextually situated in
a web of other laws that provide background principles against
which it will be understood.216 Just as a criminal statute assumes
the availability of a conspiracy charge, so statutes in general as-
sume the applicability of valid canons of interpretation.217 That the
that Chevron dictates. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. And step one asks courts to determine
whether a statutory term is ambiguous by using “traditional tools of statutory construction,”
without more. Id. at 843 n.9. So even when seeming to create statutory interpretation
precedent, the Court has insisted that it is not really telling courts how to interpret statutes;
it is just telling them how to review interpretations by others.
212. Gluck, supra note 134, at 185.
213. Id. at 184.
214. See id.
215. Baude & Sachs, supra note 195, at 1105.
216. Charles L. Briggs & Richard Bauman, Genre, Intertextuality, and Social Power, 2 J.
LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 131, 147 (1991) (“[I]ntertextual relationships between a particular
text and prior discourse ... play a crucial role in shaping form, function, discourse structure,
and meaning; ... and in building competing perspectives on what is taking place.”).
Intertextual relations set up audience expectations “regarding narrative form and content,”
and provide the terms on which “identity and power” are asserted. Id. at 147-48 (“[B]y
invoking a particular genre, producers of discourse assert (tacitly or explicitly) that they
possess the authority needed to [re]contextualize discourse that bears these historical and so-
cial connections ... in the current discursive setting.”); see also M. M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC
IMAGINATION 278-79 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981)
(arguing that foregoing texts lay down a “multitude of routes, roads and paths” through which
a given focal text is understood and in relation to which it has social effects); Jonathan R.
Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1062-70
(1998) (arguing that background principles of administrative law play a key role in the in-
terpretation of regulatory statutes).
217. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 195, at 1100.
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canons are not codified in statute hardly changes things. “Not much
turns on whether, say, the rule against perpetuities is codified by
statute or is just good law in the courts; grantors have to draft
around it all the same.”218 If intertextual background principles are
good enough for conspiracy and perpetuity, why not for interpretive
rules too?
The difference is that, unlike conspiracy and perpetuity, canons
do not behave in a law-like way. There is, after all, a pretty good
way to know whether the rule against perpetuities “is just good law
in the courts”219: courts enforce it consistently. Interpretive canons
have never achieved that status. Courts do not treat them as bind-
ing and employ no consistent parameters for determining which one
to use and when. Is the rule against surplusage “just good law in the
courts”? It depends which opinion you read. When legal practice is
higgledy-piggledy, it can be hard to say whether something is good
law or not.
Baude and Sachs try to overcome this by more or less asserting
that it is too good law: “[m]any legal canons are common law default
rules” that maintain their validity until they are “affirmatively dis-
placed.”220 But not much turns on whether canons are in fact law in
some ontological sense; what matters is whether interpreters ac-
tually use them in a law-like way. And that takes us right back to
the initial problem: lots of rules with no principle for choosing
among them. Just think of Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Com-
munities for a Great Oregon, a case famous for the deployment of
canons by both majority and dissent.221 Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority, emphasizes antisurplusage and antiderogation; Jus-
tice Scalia for the dissent focuses on noscitur a sociis and a “whole
code” presumption.222 None have been affirmatively displaced, but
which are “good law”? Which are stronger? How would we know?
If there is no default rule for deciding which rule to use, even
judges who strive to obey the law of interpretation are bound to
reach conclusions that are unpredictable and inconsistent. Of
218. Id. at 1104.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1123.
221. See generally 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
222. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 574-78, 596-98 (discussing how the opinions in Sweet
Home selected and situated text to interpret).
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course, an individual judge could consistently obey some decision
rules that she chooses (though that choice itself would be arbitrary).
But because her decision rule has no predictable relation to anyone
else’s, her personal consistency will not lead to consistency among
interpretations across judges—and would not, that is, lead to canons
acting any more law-like.
Moreover, just like doing the same corpus search does not get
everyone to the same conclusion, agreeing that a particular rule
applies does not necessarily settle things. The majority and dissent
in Lockhart v. United States applied the same rule and came to op-
posite conclusions.223 In Lockhart, the Supreme Court considered
whether a child pornography statute that imposed an enhanced
sentence for offenders with prior convictions “relating to aggravated
sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a
minor” applied to someone with a prior conviction for sexual abuse
not involving a minor.224 In other words, did “involving a minor”
modify just that last phrase “abusive sexual conduct,” or the whole
list?225
The rule of the last antecedent provides that, “in a list of dispa-
rate items, a clause modifies the item nearest to it.”226 But what is
an item? Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion held that the manda-
tory minimum applied to those with non-child-related sexual abuse
convictions, because the entire list constituted one item.227 Justice
Kagan’s opinion for the dissent argued that the statute addressed
the sentencing enhancement only to those who had abused children,
the last of several separate items.228 The canon of interpretation told
them how to act once they had decided whether the terms were
distinct or related, but it could not help them make that decision.229
And it is that decision which determined the canon’s effect.
Even if judges want to outsource interpretation to canons, then
they still have to choose among rules that can “point in other direc-
tions.”230 Indeed, even a single rule can point in different directions,
223. See generally 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016).
224. Id. at 962.
225. Id.
226. Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 85.
227. Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 962.
228. See id. at 969 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
229. See id.
230. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 148, at 59. 
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depending on how you apply it. Judges may be ruled by the rules,
but only as marionettes who hold their own strings.
B. What Are Rules for?
Without some consistent way to decide which canon to apply
when, or how, interpretive rules cannot do judges’ work for them.
Perhaps one reason it has been so difficult to converge on a decision-
making approach is that it is not entirely clear what canons of
interpretation are supposed to accomplish. That makes it difficult
to evaluate their strength or assess their success. And that surely
makes it difficult to rank them.
Consider some possible purposes for interpretive canons; stick to
linguistic canons for now. Perhaps they are supposed to serve as a
kind of instruction to Congress. “They promote clearer drafting,”
Justice Scalia has argued, by informing legislators how judges will
interpret statutes.231 Judges can thus exert a positive influence on
legislators, pushing them to do their work in a responsible way.232
Once Congress knows the rules, “you can expect those who prepare
legal documents competently to draft accordingly,” because the
canons really just articulate “presumptions about what an intelli-
gently produced text conveys.”233
As a factual matter, though, no one can give Congress a good
account of how judges will apply the rules, because judges do not
apply the rules predictably. And that is not because they are ill-
intentioned or incompetent, but because there is no accepted way to
decide which rule to apply or how to apply it. Giving Congress some
guidance as to how judges will act may be a noble aspiration, but it
is hard to do when judges fail to reliably act in any particular way.
Further, it is not clear that the aspiration is noble. The Constitu-
tion gives Congress a lot of leeway over its work. On what grounds
do judges purport to dictate best practices to legislators? Judges,
after all, must be ready to interpret all the statutes that Congress
writes, not just those drafted by “those who prepare legal documents
competently” or “intelligently” according to a judge’s standards.234
231. Id. at 51. 
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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Faithful agents generally do not force a principal’s hand. That is not
to say that courts and legislators do not, or should not, engage in
long-term exchanges of views about how best to collaboratively
produce the legal strictures that govern our society.235 But that is
hardly the same as throwing down ultimatums about statutory
drafting.
If not instructing Congress, perhaps canons are supposed to
reflect it. They might provide judges with indications of how
Congress generally uses language. That way, judges can interpret
according to the way Congress writes, at least in broad strokes. To
do that, the canons of interpretation would have to reflect legislative
drafting practices, at least in broad strokes. But the available
evidence suggests that they mostly fail to do that—fail quite
dramatically, in fact.236
Strangely, those who advocate the use of canons generally do not
urge people to investigate how well they reflect actual Congressional
practices.237 Nor do they usually argue that canons should be in-
fluenced by information about how Congress drafts statutes.238 The
implication seems to be that judicial interpretation should reflect
legislative practice—as long as only the judge gets to say what
legislative practice involves.
Another possibility: maybe canons are supposed to help judges
interpret statutes as ordinary language, not as legislature-specific
utterances. On this theory, canons reflect the linguistic practices not
of Congress, but of ordinary speakers. At least some discussions sug-
gest that linguistic canons are supposed to give judges quick rules
of thumb for determining how ordinary people would formulate a
235. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist
Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment
Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 732 (2014) (“[S]tatutory interpretation ... is necessarily
a cooperative endeavor [between courts and legislatures].”).
236. See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the
Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807 (2014) (arguing that judges should
interpret statutes according to congressional drafting practices at the time of the statute’s
enactment).
237. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 148. 
238. See, e.g., id.
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stricture, while substantive canons express normative commit-
ments.239
But the guidelines linguistic canons offer can be pretty exacting.
They ask us to assume that the same term always means the same
thing, even across a lengthy utterance; and that an utterance has no
meaningless redundancies. Attending a faculty meeting or having
a dinner conversation are probably enough to indicate that ordinary
conversation does not always work the way linguistic canons sug-
gest it does. Yet, again, proponents of canons rarely set out to revise
them to accommodate even our everyday lived experience of how
people speak.
So linguistic canons might be meant to affect Congress, reflect
Congress, or reflect ordinary speech. And they usually fail to do any
of those quite different things. No wonder we find it difficult to rank
them. 
Substantive canons might fare better, since they are generally
seen to reflect normative commitments about judging and political
ordering. Still, even they pose similar problems. For instance, what
is the plain meaning rule—which instructs a court to use evidence
outside the statutory text only if that text itself is not clear—sup-
posed to accomplish? William Baude and Ryan Doerfler criticize
that rule for failing to give insight into the statute.240 When you are
trying to ferret out the truth, they argue, it makes no sense to use
one kind of evidence only if another is insufficient: “information is
either useful or not.”241 True, but not all inquiries are of the ferret-
ing sort. The information a mammogram or prostate cancer screen-
ing yields, for instance, is surely relevant to determining whether
a person has cancer. But it may not always be useful. Its utility
depends on lots of things other than relevance: the patient’s age and
that kind of cancer’s speed; the costs and benefits of potential follow-
up procedures; the psychological weight of the question on that par-
ticular patient; and so on. Whether information is useful, in other
words, depends on what you are trying to do with it in a particular
decision-making context.
239. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2005).
240. See generally William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 539 (2017).
241. Id. at 540. 
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The problem—if you want to see it as a problem—is that legal
interpretation, too, involves decisionmaking.242 Interpreters are
not mere conduits; they are actors taking politically significant
actions. The meanings and effects of legal texts are at least partly
produced through their interpretation.243 Legal interpretation
presents a form of justification or rationalization—an appeal to
readers for agreement, not a falsifiable scientific inquiry.244 An
interpretive canon, meanwhile, purports to guide the decision-
making process. That means that an interpretive canon—a linguis-
tic as much as a substantive one—implies a commitment to some
decision-making principle.
The plain meaning rule, for instance, may not aim to give us more
information about the statute. Rather, it may expresss a com-
mitment to treating statutory text as more valuable than other
sources—not in an empirical-inquiry way, but in a normative-
legitimation way. Similarly, as John Manning has outlined, the
absurdity canon commits judges to the decision-making principle
that Congress will not violate “commonly held social values” with-
out saying so outright.245
When rules express normative commitments, we at least can
outline reasonable options for assessing them. We can take a po-
sition on their normative stand. For instance, Manning argues that
the antiabsurdity rule is inappropriate in a government built on the
“sharp separation of lawmaking from judging,” that he contends is
a “crucial premise[ ] of the constitutional structure.”246 Or we can
assess how well the rule actually controls decisionmaking. Manning
does not argue that the anti-absurdity rule is ineffective, but he
does claim that judges can achieve its normative goals through oth-
er means that he finds more acceptable.247 Opining on a normative
242. Solan, supra note 124, at 17 (“[T]ranslators have to make decisions.”). 
243. See id. at 14-18.
244. Guyora Binder, Aesthetic Judgment and Legal Justification, 43 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y
79, 80 (2008) (“[L]egal argument ... make[s] a rhetorical appeal to aesthetic judgment rather
than an empirical claim to mimetic accuracy, ... [and that appeal is fundamental to the] larger
question of the legal system’s legitimacy.”). 
245. Manning, supra note 146, at 2389-90.
246. Id. at 2391.
247. Id. at 2392 (arguing that abandoning the anti-absurdity rule “scarcely leaves judges
defenseless against legislative infringement of the types of values that the absurdity doctrine
now protects”).
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commitment and evaluating its efficacy does not quite produce a de-
cision rule for choosing among different rules, but at least it gives
us a way of evaluating them.
But what about rules whose commitments are more oblique? The
rule of the last antecedent is certainly valid and legitimate.248 Yet
it is not entirely clear what principles underlie it. What impulse
justifies it? To what position does it commit a judge? Maybe it is
something like, “statutes are consistently written to distinguish list
items that are controlled by a qualifier from those that are not.” But
this is clearly false as an empirical matter. Just reading a statute
suggests it is wrong, and research confirms that impression.249
Perhaps the principle is that “ordinary speech consistently distin-
guishes list items that are controlled by a qualifier from those that
are not.” False again.250 Or maybe it is “Congress ought to write
statutes that way.” Not falsifiable, but questionable: why do judges
get to tell Congress what to do? It is difficult to rationally argue for
or against the rule, to determine how it should apply, or evaluate its
strength relative to other rules, when its underlying basis is not
articulated or obvious.
The rule of the last antecedent commits a judge to a way of
making a decision that seems rather arbitrary, or at least not
clearly motivated. Without knowing what principle it serves, a judge
might find it difficult to decide how seriously to treat it or how to
apply it in a particular case. Say the rule of the last antecedent
pulls in one direction and the rule against surplusage pulls in
another. How do we assess their relative strengths? Each provides
guidance for making an interpretive decision. But without some
248. See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 962-63 (2016).
249. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 134, at 209 (explaining that her research indicates that
even “seasoned statutory players” find statutory text “dense and unintelligible”).
250. The opinions in Lockhart v. United States make up plausible ordinary-language
examples that go both ways. See generally 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016). Justice Sotomayor imagines
baseball scouts asked to find “a defensive catcher, a quick-footed shortstop, or a pitcher from
last year’s World Champion Kansas City Royals,” concluding that the scouts would not care
if the catcher were with the Royals. Id. at 963. Justice Kagan imagines someone asking a
friend to help them “meet ‘an actor, director, or producer involved with the new Star Wars
movie,’” noting that a Zoolander actor would not do. Id. at 969 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Both
examples seem plausible. That is because there is no rule of the last antecedent in everyday
English—at least not one that can be applied acontextually, without background knowledge
about the communicative situation and wider cultural factors, such as the reasons people look
for catchers and want to be introduced to actors. 
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articulation of their motivations, it is impossible to make a princi-
pled decision about their relative weighting in any given situation.
Even the somewhat distinct status of substantive canons does not
get us out of this bind. Who should win a match-up between the rule
against surplusage and the presumption against preemption? There
are surely good arguments for following both our commitment to a
particular way of treating language, and to a particular way of
distributing political power, but there is no principle that helps us
decide what to do when they conflict.
So it may not be too surprising that judges are both so inconsis-
tent in their use of canons, and so unwilling to impose system-wide
order on it. Without a consensus, or even a discussion, of what it is
that makes a canon worthwhile, it is naturally difficult to make a
case for preferring one over another. I do not mean to suggest that
the absence of a preference order is necessarily a problem: there
may be good reasons to avoid a rigid hierarchy in favor of a case-by-
case determination of a given canon’s utility in a given situation.251
The problem is that without some articulation of what a canon is
supposed to accomplish, there is no way to figure out if it is likely to
succeed.
As with other kinds of outsourcing, judges can present themselves
as giving interpretive authority over to rules of interpretation—
strictures imposed by someone else. But the rules present a smor-
gasbord of interpretive options. And since there is neither consensus
nor articulation regarding what motivates or justifies many canons,
there is little ground on which to argue for the primacy of one over
another. This form of outsourcing presents judges as bound by rules,
then leaves judges to decide what it is that should bind them.
V. DEMOCRATIZING INTERPRETATION
Judges and commentators sometimes seem almost embarrassed
about the ongoing negotiations involved in maintaining a somewhat
stable yet never ossified legal system. By appearing to lodge power
251. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (arguing that judges do, and should, make
such case-by-case determinations); Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation as Contestatory
Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221 (2013) (arguing that such case-by-case determinations
are desirable from the perspective of democracy).
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outside the adjudicating court, outsourcing obscures that negotia-
tion—and perhaps more importantly, obscures the constant avail-
ability of negotiation. The approaches I have discussed ignore, deny,
or try to evade the central role of judicial choice in interpretation.
Key interpretive decisions appear as though in the passive voice,
situated within the domains of others—speakers, audiences, tra-
ditions.
Ignoring the indeterminate, negotiated aspects of interpretation
gives outsourcers a firm, seemingly impregnable, basis for their con-
clusions: a right answer to an interpretive question. Outsourcing
thus bolsters an appearance of certainty. But that appearance of
certainty comes at the cost of avoiding dispute about the normative,
empirical, and methodological questions that interpretation raises.
Outsourcing may well grow out of worries about unelected judges
usurping democratic power, but in its false certainty it stymies the
very kind of debate that characterizes democratic process. This Part
explores the stakes of trying to eliminate choice in legal interpreta-
tion, and the limits of getting it right. Both the disparagement of
choice and the vaunting of certainty, I argue, have profound neg-
ative implications for our conception of democracy.
A. There’s No Deciding Not to Decide
As I have discussed in other work, statutory interpretation
depends on some unavoidable, structuring choices: selecting text to
interpret and situating it in a context the interpreter constructs.252
Because selecting and situating statutory text form the infrastruc-
ture on which any interpretation is built, there is, fundamentally,
no way to avoid making crucial choices in legal interpretation.
Outsourcing interpretation, in turn, appears to evade choices about
meanings. Having decided what to interpret and how to situate it,
judges seem to give authority for deciding on meaning over to the
inhabitants of the context they have constructed—speakers,
audiences, and traditions. This attempt at recusal echoes a worry
that has occupied constitutional theory for decades: how to legiti-
mize judicial review by a “countermajoritarian” institution.253 
252. See generally Bernstein, supra note 9.
253. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
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Countermajoritarianism is strictly speaking a constitutional
worry: unelected judges make rules that elected legislatures effec-
tively cannot override.254 But statutory interpretation echoes that
concern. Both require unelected judges to expound the meaning of
texts written by elected bodies. The countermajoritarian worry runs
deep—or at least broad—in recent American legal thought.255 Small
wonder, then, that judges and commentators search for ways to
democratize interpretation.256 If judges must be burdened with the
responsibility of pronouncing the law, they can at least give the
decision-making power over to someone else.
As the preceding Parts demonstrate, though, interpretive out-
sourcing does not meaningfully limit judicial choices.257 The
authority that judges appear to give away to the demos somehow
ends up making its way back. The decisions they make about
statutory meanings, moreover, are built on an infrastructure of
interpretation that indelibly involves other, conceptually prior,
decisions about what to interpret and what light to view it in.
Outsourcing implies that judges could address the counterma-
joritarian difficulty by “majoritizing” their legal pronouncements.
But this implication runs aground on the fact that outsourcing does
not actually obviate the decisions judges must make—it only ob-
scures them.258
Some seek to avoid these multiple underlying choices by suggest-
ing a higher-order distinction between law, a hierarchical structure
that works through commands and obligations, and language, a
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (“[J]udicial review is a countermajoritarian force in our system.”).
This problem “has been the central obsession of modern constitutional scholarship.” Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334-35 n.1 (1998).
254. See Friedman, supra note 253, at 334-35.
255. See id. at 334-35 n.1.
256. As I discuss in Part III, proponents of textualism often link their approach to the
problem of judicial legitimacy. See supra Part III. But even when they do not refer to the issue
explicitly, countermajoritarian worries form part of the background against which legal writ-
ers work.
257. See supra Parts II, II.A, II.B, and III (discussing how various outsourcing methods still
require judges to make the ultimate decision as to meaning).
258. The outsourcing impulse also runs into the legitimacy problems of majoritarian legal
interpretation, which threatens to promote majority desires over the protection of minorities
and individuals guaranteed by our constitutional system. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694, 750 (1995).
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flatter and more multifarious entity that evolves through prac-
tices.259 A number of theoretical works imply this distinction.260
Baude and Sachs propose it explicitly: we should, they say, “distin-
guish[ ] language from law”261 because “what linguistic conventions
to use” when interpreting statutes “is itself a question of law.”262
They fault scholars for treating interpretation as a linguistic is-
sue—subject to the vagaries of communicative practices—when it is
actually a legal one subject to hierarchical ordering principles.263
“The crucial question for legal interpreters isn’t ‘what do these
words mean,’ but ... [w]hat law did this instrument make?”264 On
this phrasing, there are two separate objects in the world: law on
the one hand, and language on the other, kind of like a sandwich
might have ham on the one hand and cheese on the other.
But that is not how the relationship between law and language
works. Rather than forming two separate categories, law and lan-
guage have a part-whole relationship. Language is an encompassing
social practice; law is one item within it. To put it bluntly, law is
expressed through language. This means we cannot separate law
from language; the decision to avoid other decisions is not available.
To figure out “[w]hat law ... this instrument ma[d]e,” we have to
consider “what ... these words mean.”265 Law and language is not
like ham and cheese. It is more like ham and sandwich.266
B. Either-or/Both-and
Even at an abstract level, then, one cannot simply choose to work
with law and be done with choices about meaning. Normative,
empirical, and methodological decisions are intrinsic to every level
of legal interpretation. Given that, we might ask what is accom-
plished by outsourcing’s implicit claim to avoiding decisions that
259. See, e.g., Baude & Sachs, supra note 215, at 1082-83.
260. See, e.g., id.
261. Id. at 1085.
262. See id. at 1083. 
263. See id. at 1082.
264. Id. at 1083.
265. Id.
266. The analogy is not perfect: one can encounter ham without reference to a sandwich,
but there is no law independent of language. A more precise rendering might read, “law :
language : (ham in a ham-and-cheese sandwich) : sandwich.” 
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are not actually avoidable. One key effect of outsourcing is to pres-
ent the meaning of disputed legal texts as something that can be ob-
vious—something we can get at in a relatively straightforward
way.267 There may, of course, be instances where statutory language
seems easy to get right. If the statute says “no vehicles in the park,”
everyone might agree that cars are prohibited. But these are not the
cases relevant to statutory interpretation: a case that argues some-
thing truly obvious usually will not get very far. Moreover, human
ingenuity is great enough that people frequently manage to make
what at first seems obviously contestable; that, in a sense, is what
courts are for.
Outsourcing allows interpreters to lay claim to certainty about
legal meaning: to say they have got legal interpretation somehow
right. The idea that interpretation is something that can be got
right may be related to a common misunderstanding about language
and law: that language is primarily a tool for describing things,
while law affects them.268 Perhaps the way we have traditionally
phrased the relevant judicial power pushes us to think in this
direction. What does it mean, after all, to “say what the law is”?269
If language consists merely of reference and predication, saying
what the law is may just mean accurately describing a preexisting
object, law.
But a century of scholarship has shown that reference and
predication is just the tip of the iceberg; language, too, affects and
creates.270 The best-known version of creative language is the speech
267. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 646-47.
268. See, e.g., Weissbourd & Mertz, supra note 104, at 627 (noting that discussions of legal
language tend to focus on the presupposing aspects of communication, which underlie refer-
ence and predication, rather than its creative aspects, through which language affects the
world).
269. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
270. Information exchange involves identifying an object in the world and making
propositions about it, which is what communication scholars call language’s “referential”
function. ROMAN JAKOBSON, LANGUAGE IN LITERATURE 66 (Krystyna Pomorska & Stephen
Rudy eds., 1987). “[R]eference-and-predication” is the aspect of language use most available
to speakers’ awareness. See Michael Silverstein, Language Structure and Linguistic Ideology,
in THE ELEMENTS: A PARASESSION ON LINGUISTIC UNITS AND LEVELS 193, 208 (Paul R. Clyne
et al. eds., 1979) (noting the widespread “tendency to rationalize the pragmatic system of a
language ... with an ideology of language that centers on reference-and-predication” and
ignores the other factors that go into meaning creation); see also Michael Silverstein,
Metapragmatic Discourse and Metapragmatic Function, in REFLEXIVE LANGUAGE: REPORTED
SPEECH AND METAPRAGMATICS 33, 33 (John A. Lucy ed., 1993) (explaining that reference and
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act, or performative utterance, which brings a new state of affairs
into being.271 In the classic example, the officiant who pronounces a
couple married does not merely refer to, or predicate about, that
state of affairs; she creates it.272 But creativity suffuses language far
beyond the classic speech acts, allowing linguistic utterances, pat-
terns, and so on to affect their social worlds.273
This is especially so in the law, where authorized speakers affect,
and even bind, others in far-reaching ways. When the Supreme
Court interprets a statute, it offers not just a description, but a
prescription of meaning to the parties before it, to other courts, to
future litigants, to Congress, and to us all. The idea that such a
saying merely describes an existing entity flies in the face of our
experience of legal authority. Courts “say what the law is”274 much
the way the officiant says what a couple is.275
predication can be described as what we think of as “language in the usual sense,” that is,
“some grammatically conforming system of expression-types, tokens of which refer-to some
universe of referents and predicate-about some universe of states-of-affairs”). But
communication—like any social endeavor—is crowded with other functions and factors. Over
the last century, scholars have studied a range of simultaneous functions a given utterance
may perform, from expressing attitudes, to glossing other speech, to highlighting its own form,
to just keeping the channel of communication open, among others. See JAKOBSON, supra note
270, at 67-69 (describing the emotive, conative, poetic, metalingual, and phatic functions of
language). And they have noted the ways that making meaning from language both depends
on contextual factors (the “presuppos[ing]” aspect) and creates new contexts by affecting the
world around (the “creative” aspect); see also Michael Silverstein, Shifters, Linguistic
Categories, and Cultural Description, in MEANING IN ANTHROPOLOGY 11, 33-34 (Keith H. Basso
& Henry A. Selby eds., 1976) (distinguishing between “aspect[s] of the speech situation ...
presupposed by the sign token” and the creative aspect, which “make[s] explicit and overt the
parameters of structure of the ongoing events” and brings some aspect “into sharp cognitive
relief”). Legal writing often “fail[s] to do justice to the creativity of speech, concentrating
instead on presupposed ... elements of the speech situation.” Weissbourd & Mertz, supra note
104, at 627. So do many everyday understandings of how language works. Research indicates
that speakers, in general, are more sensitive to the referents that exist independently of a
communication than they are to the social relations or states of affairs that communication
itself creates or highlights in a new way. See Silverstein, supra note 73, at 382-83. The
creative power of speech often falls outside “[t]he [l]imits of [a]wareness.” Id. 
271. See J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 4-7 (1962); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 16-19 (1969).
272. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 9, at 642.
273. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, OUR WORD IS OUR BOND: HOW LEGAL SPEECH ACTS 41-42
(2014); Bernstein, supra note 9, at 641-49.
274. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
275. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 9, at 642.
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Yet both cases and commentaries reveal people trying desperately
to hem language in, and to subdue the unruly liveliness of legal
communication by stuffing it into neat categories. A recent example:
a ship’s captain threw out fish he’d caught even though a federal
officer ordered him to preserve the fish until he got back to shore.276
The fish were purportedly too small to permissibly catch under the
relevant regulations; the officer wanted them preserved for inspec-
tion. A statute prohibits “destroy[ing]” a “record, document, or
tangible object” to “impede” a federal investigation.277 Were the fish
tangible objects under the statute?278 In Yates v. United States, a
majority of the Supreme Court said no, because “tangible object” in
that context included only things “used to record or preserve infor-
mation.”279 The dissent said any tangible object would do.280
Neither considered that the fish might be both tangible and
meaning-bearing objects “used to record or preserve information.”281
After all, a fish’s body provides information about its size, which is
the information the officer wanted to preserve. Meaning often comes
in this way, complexly bound up with multiple other things. Long
grass bent over in a field can be both an object in itself and a sign of
something that has tramped over it.282 Which one matters more
depends on whether you are interested in mowing the grass or
tracking the tramper. Different decision-making contexts will high-
light different aspects of signification. But the grass itself harbors
both at once, and more.
Judges often employ claims to certainty in this way, to legitimize
interpretive conclusions without really justifying them or opening
them up to debate. Theorists do, too. For example, Andrei Marmor
discusses Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, in which the Supreme
Court had to decide whether the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
prohibited a dam for which Congress had approved funding, but
276. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1078 (2015) (pluarilty opinion).
277. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)). 
278. See id. at 1079.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“A ‘tangible object’ is an object that’s tangible.”).
281. Id. at 1079.
282. In the terminology of semiotic theory, the bent grass functions as an index of prior
tramping. See RICHARD J. PARMENTIER, SIGNS IN SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SEMIOTIC ANTHRO-
POLOGY 3-4 (1994) (introducing Charles Sanders Peirce’s Semiotic Theory).
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which would harm a protected species.283 Because Congress knew
about the conflict with the ESA when it authorized the funding, it
is clear—to Marmor, anyway—that Congress actually “hoped” to get
the dam built, but wanted to do so “obliquely by ... appropriat[ing]
... funds” rather than repudiating the ESA.284 “One can only sur-
mise,” Marmor concludes, “that there was not enough support in
Congress to face the environmentalists head-on.”285
Marmor argues that the strategic nature of legal language
differentiates it from ordinary conversation, which he describes as
characterized by cooperative information exchange.286 Separating
information exchange from strategic language use thus underlies
his claim to interpretive certainty about what Congress really want-
ed. But each part of this neat image is deceptive.
For one thing, everyday experience suggests that ordinary con-
versation is full of strategy. “Let’s get together soon.” “How do these
pants look on me?” “Thanks for a fascinating workshop presenta-
tion.” A wealth of empirical research into naturally occurring dis-
cursive practices backs that up.287 Similarly, the situation Marmor
283. 437 U.S. 153, 156 (1978); Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More Than It Says? On
Some Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE
IN THE LAW 83, 101-04 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).
284. Marmor, supra note 283, at 102-03.
285. Id. at 103.
286. Id. at 83 (contrasting “ordinary conversations, in which the parties are presumed to
engage in a cooperative exchange of information,” and legal communication, which “is
strategic in nature”).
287. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, FORMS OF TALK 128 (Erving Goffman & Dell Hymes eds.,
1981) (discussing the “alignment,” “stance,” or “projected self” expressed in the “footing” of
communicative event participants, and arguing that “[a] change in footing implies a change
in the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present .... [and] is another way of
talking about a change in our frame for events”); Susan Ervin-Tripp, Is Sybil There? The
Structure of Some American English Directives, 5 LANGUAGE SOC’Y. 25, 64 (1976) (analyzing
ways speakers make requests without being explicit, and noting that understanding these
directives requires knowing not just the meanings of words, but also relevant cultural norms);
Susan Gal, Codeswitching and Consciousness in the European Periphery, 14 AM. ETHNOLOGIST
637, 637 (1987) (“Patterns of choice among linguistic variants can ... reveal ... how [speakers]
respond symbolically to class relations ... and ... understand their historic position and
identity within regional economic systems structured around dependency and unequal
development.”); Michael Silverstein, The Improvisational Performance of Culture in Realtime
Discursive Practice, in CREATIVITY IN PERFORMANCE 265, 282-95 (R. Keith Sawyer ed., 1997)
(analyzing a naturally occurring conversation involving the exchange of biographical
information, which turns out to involve a wealth of socially strategic utterances drawing on
shared understandings of belonging and status hierarchies).
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describes supports a range of interpretations.288 Maybe there was
not enough support in Congress to face the construction industry
head-on. Or maybe Congress wanted to allow the dam as long as it
adhered to legal strictures, which it left an expert agency to deter-
mine. One could even wonder if some members of Congress wanted
to have their cake and eat it too: to be seen as protecting the en-
vironment and bolstering the economy. This would surely not be the
only time that legislators left incommensurate desires and under-
standings to others—agencies and courts—to commensurate. Like
the Yates opinions, Marmor’s argument treats legal meaning as an
either-or matter, rather than the both-and phenomenon it is.289
Recently, Judge Easterbrook has argued affirmatively for the
kind of simplification I criticize here.290 He notes that judges are
incredibly busy generalists.291 They have neither expertise in every
area of law they adjudicate, nor the time to sift through the leg-
islative history that might reveal congressional deals, hopes, or
desires.292 Given their limitations, judges should choose “an ap-
propriately modest interpretive strategy,” the one that “causes the
least damage when it goes wrong.”293
Easterbrook claims that textualism is that “modest” strategy.294
But as I explain in Part IV, textualism empowers interpreters in the
name of constraining them.295 And anyway, Easterbrook gives us no
288. See Marmor, supra note 283, at 102-03.
289. See, e.g., Claudia Bianchi, What Did You (Legally) Say? Cooperative and Strategic
Interactions, in 7 PRAGMATICS AND LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 185, 185-86
(Alessandro Capone & Francesca Poggi eds., 2016) (arguing that Marmor overestimates both
the “collaborative aspect of cooperative conversations” and the “conflictual aspect of strategic
conversations”).
290. Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 82, 96.
291. See id. at 96-97.
292. See id. Interestingly, Easterbrook focuses on a method that aims to uncover the
motivations of individual legislators and the roles they played in the enactment process. See
id. at 92 (“Here I want to discuss an older argument for identifying reliable legislative history
... [which] proposed that judges could check the reliability of legislative history ... by asking
whether it represented a costly commitment.” (footnote omitted)). Easterbrook explicitly
eschews responding to newer proposals that seek to uncover not the intentions or desires of
specific legislators, but the kind of information about the statute’s likely effects that might
have given legislators a shared understanding of the statute, irrespective of whether they
thought it was a good idea. See id. (expressing, for example, “some sympathy” with the “CBO
canon” proposed by Abbe Gluck but not engaging with it).
293. Id. at 97.
294. Id.
295. See supra Part IV.
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way to evaluate interpretive “damage.”296 In agreeing that there
are sound methods, but disclaiming any ability or obligation to use
them, Easterbrook seems to endorse what we might call the Naked
Lunch canon, after the William Burroughs novel whose narrator
quips, “As one judge said to another: ‘Be just and if you can’t be just,
be arbitrary.’”297
C. Structural Uncertainty
The basic problem with claiming to avoid choice and to achieve
certainty is that interpreting legal language makes those things
impossible. They are impossible due to the characteristics of both
language in general, and legal language in particular. Linguistic
meaning in general is subject to the possibility of controversy. Like
all linguistic communication, legal expressions can be vague, in the
sense that they are unclear at the margins.298 They can be ambigu-
ous, in the sense of lacking a single uncontroversial object or im-
plication.299 They can be multivalent, in the sense of having more
than one reasonably imputable meaning.300
Legal language depends on changeable and contestable cultural
conventions for semantic meaning and pragmatic effect.301 It is
296. See Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 97.
297. WILLIAM S. BURROUGHS, NAKED LUNCH 5 (James Grauerholz & Barry Miles eds.,
2001). 
298. See, e.g., Anthony O’Rourke, Semantic Vagueness and Extrajudicial Constitutional
Decisionmaking, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1301, 1308-09 (“Philosophers of language define
semantic vagueness by reference to ‘borderline cases’” that do not clearly fall either within or
without a term’s compass); see also TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 30-33 (2000).
299. See Bernstein, supra note 117, at 6 (“‘[A]mbiguous’ suggests that a term has a single,
correct interpretation, but that the co-text leaves that meaning unclear.”).
300. See id. at 6-7 (“With multivalence, there is no single correct answer to the question
of what a word refers to, because there are multiple correct possibilities.”). 
301. For example, tomatoes may have obviously been vegetables in the “common language
of the people” of Nix v. Hedden’s day, but if the East Asian fashion of eating tomatoes along
with other fruit for dessert catches on, that conclusion may seem less clear. Nix v. Hedden,
149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893) (determining that tomatoes were vegetables for purposes of a
customs statute and noting that tomatoes are like “vegetables, which are ... usually served
at dinner” as opposed to fruits, which usually appear “as dessert”). Empirical ethnographic
work on language and communication has demonstrated how language use and even lexical
definition changes with cultural shifts. See, e.g., Susan Gal, Bartók’s Funeral: Representations
of Europe in Hungarian Political Rhetoric, 18 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 440, 444 (1991). For instance,
in analyzing the concept of “Europe” in Hungarian political debates over the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, Susan Gal noted that the definition and description of Europe changed
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intertextually situated in wide, expansive webs of discourse, which
render its effects flexible.302 It is subject to reinterpretation through
uptake by new audiences and interlocutors who are themselves
embedded in culturally structured forms of intertextual reference
and text production.303 And it may be brought to bear in situations
that differ from, or were inconceivable at, its context of production,
making the specifics of its application unpredictable.304
Like much writing (and perhaps more than most), legal language
largely lacks the opportunities for repair, correction, and specifica-
tion that realtime communicators routinely use.305 The paucity of
opportunities to clarify or negotiate about meanings in real time, in
with each new debate: “although the terms—Europe/Hungary, east/west—remain the same,
their meanings shift dramatically over time, as do the social groups that advocate [for] each
... and the political and economic strategies they propose.” Id. These changes in the terms’
meanings are masked by their continued use in a “discourse” that “tends to reduce
complicated arguments to dualities and helps to unite these disparate movements (over time),
constructing a deceptive image of continuity and creating a legitimating solidarity with
previous eras.” Id. at 446; see also Michael Silverstein & Greg Urban, The Natural History of
Discourse, in NATURAL HISTORIES OF DISCOURSE 1, 8 (Michael Silverstein & Greg Urban eds.,
1996) (arguing that the production of authoritative texts is one way societies lay claim to a
unified, enduring culture, instilling a sense of continuity and coherence over time, even
though “every discourse instance is emergent and creative and hence capable of recalibrating
the metadiscursive category for future projections”). 
302. For instance, a twentieth-century judge interpreting the word “harm” in a statutory
definition having to do with the “taking” of animals can choose to view it as intertextually
related to contemporary understandings of harm, or alternatively to the common law notion
of animal taking. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 574-78 (discussing this choice); see also, e.g.,
Judith T. Irvine, Shadow Conversations: The Indeterminacy of Participant Roles, in NATURAL
HISTORIES OF DISCOURSE, supra note 301, at 131, 140 (“[A]n utterance has implicit links to
many dialogues ... which together inform its significance, influence its form, and contribute
to its performative force.”).
303. For example, an offhand comment in one judicial opinion can become elaborated over
a series of cases to become a central part of the doctrine. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 180,
at 730-44 (tracing the development of the “special factors” doctrine in constitutional tort
suits).
304. See id.
305. See Aria Razfar, Language Ideologies in Practice: Repair and Classroom Discourse, 16
LINGUISTICS & EDUC. 404 (2005) (collecting literature on repair in studies of communication
and analyzing repair in the classroom setting); see also Michael Silverstein, “Cultural”
Concepts and the Language-Culture Nexus, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 621, 622 (2004)
(“[D]iscursive interaction brings sociocultural concepts into here-and-now contexts ... via
emergent patternings of semiotic forms.... Precipitated as entextualizations (by-degrees
coherent and stable textual arrays) in relation to contextualizations (how texts point to a
framing or surround for the text), such ‘text-in-context’ is the basis for all interpretative or
hermeneutic analysis.”). 
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turn, may make legal texts particularly subject to recontextualized
reinterpretation.
In addition, the potential for contestation and reinterpretation is
central to the American legal system. At the legislation stage, legal
strictures often embody compromises and strategic silences that
effectively delegate meaning-making decisions to other people at
other times. The Chevron doctrine, which asks courts to defer to rea-
sonable administrative agency interpretations of ambiguous stat-
utory terms, recognizes this directly: the presence of an ambiguous
term in a regulatory statute implies that Congress has delegated
interpretive specification to the agency.306 Although no doctrine spe-
cifically says so, our judicial system suggests that legislation also
leaves a lot of meaning-making decisions to judges who must in-
terpret statutory language in future cases.307 In practice, the judge
is one of the statute’s addressees.308
Perhaps most strikingly, our system of adjudication makes fixed
legal meanings impossible. It is organized as a chain of open-ended,
if punctuated, meaning-making events over time; each interpreta-
tion becomes an object for future interpretations.309 Since we depend
on litigants to bring the cases that impel judges to interpret and
reinterpret statutory terms, we never know when such an event
might come around. But the structure of our adjudication system
means that any seemingly final answer a judicial opinion offers is
subject to potential reinterpretation in the future. Similarly, al-
306. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
Strategic silences are central not only to legislative enactments but also to judicial decisions,
which often leave decisions for a later time or decline to specify rules, standards, or
conclusions. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004) (“We need not decide
in this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying
declarations.”).
307. See SCALIA, supra note 139, at 13-14 (“[A] very small proportion of judges’ work is
constitutional interpretation.... By far the greatest part of what I and all federal judges do is
to interpret the meaning of federal statutes and federal agency regulations.”).
308. Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407, 415
(1950).
309. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 648 (“[I]n an adversarial system, it is precisely arguing
about things that makes them arguable.”). The common law adjudication system is a beautiful
instantiation of the more general process of semiosis described by the American pragmatist
Charles Sanders Peirce, in which every interpretant becomes itself a sign ready for further
interpretation. See generally PARMENTIER, supra note 282, at 3; Barton Beebe, The Semiotic
Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2004) (applying the semiotic analysis to
trademark law’s dilution doctrine).
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though we never know when or whether a particular legal term will
become part of a dispute that impels interpretation, our adversarial
system renders most legal terms potentially subject to such dis-
pute.310
We sometimes say that finality is a value in our legal system.311
But finality comes to litigants, not to laws.312 Our system is set up
to provide many moments of provisional closure, such that a dis-
pute about meaning can be decided with seeming finality now, but
reopened later.313
This does not mean that legal meanings are completely unmoor-
ed or subject to simple whim, any more than other kinds of effica-
cious utterances are. We have ways of provisionally stabilizing
meanings, from indexes314 and speech act felicity conditions315 to
metalinguistic glosses,316 argumentative genres,317 and cultural pat-
terns.318 These tools are instilled in our communicative habits and
embedded in our intuitive understandings of legitimate communi-
cation; violations often carry sanctions.319 Adjudication in particular
imposes some bottlenecks on indeterminacy, as interpretive debates
have to be formulated in ways cognizable by courts (another way,
perhaps, that we gloss over normative judgments with seemingly
objective criteria).320 Moreover, because of their sociological simi-
larities, judges are likely to share many linguistic intuitions with
the people who write statutes; the continued recourse to “speakers
like us” helps stabilize legal meanings too.321 Through specification,
310. This structural fact is something that Justice Scalia’s Tanner lectures ignore with the
claim that America has “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System.” SCALIA, supra note 139,
at 3. The predominance of statutory law over common-law laws does not alter the common law
structure of adjudication in American courts. See Strauss, supra note 137, at 889-90.
311. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, When is Finality ... Final? Rehearing and Resur-
rection in the Supreme Court, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 1-2 (2011).
312. See id. at 2.
313. See id. at 1-2; supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 126, 271-73 and accomanying text.
316. See supra Part III.A.
317. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
318. See, e.g., supra note 287.
319. See supra Part II.A.
320. See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text.
321. See supra Part II.B.2.
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articulation, and change over cases, regulations, and commentaries,
laws can achieve an undulating sort of solidity.
So, as elsewhere in social life, contestability does not necessarily
lead to untrammeled power. But it interacts with power in interest-
ing ways. The ways that we provisionally stabilize meaning, after
all—the patterning of genre and the bounds of acceptability—are
revealed, and changed, in practice, rather than knowable in the
abstract.322 Judicial interpretations thus bear a heavy and some-
what contradictory burden. They are supposed to fix legal meanings
to ensure the predictability and consistency of the law; but they do
so within an adjudicatory system that undermines the fixation of
meaning.323 They are supposed to propound the law in a way that
legitimizes their own institutional role; but the discourse connecting
legitimacy to determinate meanings undermines their ability to do
so convincingly.324 But convincing they must strive to be, because
legal interpretation is as much an appeal as an imposition: to
occupy their roles successfully, judges must give others reasons to
accept their conclusions. Yet, coming full circle, that convincing
involves reasons why others should agree that a legal text ought to
be given some determinate meaning, in a situation where both the
nature of language and the nature of our legal system render such
texts fundamentally contingent.
The roles, structures, and obligations that judicial interpretation
must negotiate are, thus, somewhat in tension with one another.
And yet it seems that our legal culture and our legal system, place
a lot of trust in judges. We ask them to tell us what ordinary people
think without consulting ordinary people; we tell them to take their
pick from a grab bag of rules; we set up an adjudicative system that
renders statutory terms always subject to judicial reinterpretation.
And judges, in turn, generally act pretty comfortable with that re-
sponsibility. They outsource powers in ways that sneakily empower
them. Or they simply assert the meaning of a term they are charged
with interpreting. Given all of the agonizing about statutory
interpretation by both scholars and judges, in practice courts often
322. See supra Part II.B.1.
323. See supra notes 298-310 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part III.A.
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treat it as surprisingly unproblematic: a matter of more or less sim-
ple say-so that is tolerated by others.
There may be good reason to trust the judgment of judges. They
are trained professionals with experience interpreting legal texts.
Their opinions address and affect broad and diverse audiences in-
cluding laypeople, legal professionals, legislators, and other judges,
many of whom respond to judicial pronouncements, letting judges
know what people think of their conclusions. And maybe there is
something to the multilayered vetting of the federal appointments
process, or even the election of judges in the states that use it.325 Or
maybe, on the contrary, the judicial selection system is too politi-
cized, and an arena that allows narrow majorities to install long-
term advocates in deceptively neutral positions.326
In some sense, whether trusting judges is a good idea is a bit be-
side the point. The fact is that our legal system vests a lot of power
in judges to exercise judgment. They have no choice but to bear that
power. We should, of course, weigh in on how they ought to judge,
and evaluate whether they do so badly or well. But grading an in-
terpretive approach on the extent to which it restricts or outsources
judgment is a bit like evaluating someone on how well she does not
take responsibility for her work.
Legal interpretation is largely about finding non-arbitrary jus-
tifications for essentially contingent developments.327 That is the
attraction of outsourcing: it appears to provide an externally val-
idated resolution to a question that ultimately lacks a single right
answer.328 But pretending to achieve certainty in a system built
around synchronic compromise and diachronic change may under-
mine the very democratic process that outsourcers are concerned
with. Facing indeterminacy and explaining the always provisional
ways we seek to mitigate it may fulfill those democratic aspirations
better.
325. See Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 1559, 1571 (2010) (“[M]ost of the judges who give statutes their final interpretations
are elected.”). 
326. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 659, 660-61 (2005).
327. See Binder, supra note 244, at 94; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory
Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 635-36 (1990).
328. See supra Part V.B.
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VI. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY AND DISPUTE
Outsourcing appears to alleviate anxieties about countermajor-
itarian judges by giving interpretive power to others, but it cannot
make good on that democratizing promise. But how democratizing
is that promise, really? Both our language and our legal system
are structured to prevent final answers to interpretive disputes. Is
it really so democratic to insist on reaching final answers anyway?
Rather than seeking a better interpreter to outsource to, perhaps
it makes more sense to ask how judges can, and should, exercise
judgment in a way that merits the trust our system places in them.
That, of course, requires decisions of its own. What justifies legal
interpretation, how can interpreters achieve that, and how do we
know if they have? These are difficult and debatable questions. But
engaging those underlying issues may be more productive than
competing for ways to restrain the authority that we also insist
judges exercise.
What then should we require of interpreters? At the simplest
level, we should ask whether an interpretive move does what it
seems to. Does a quotation actually evidence the linguistic practices
of the speakers it claims to present? Does a claim about shared un-
derstandings represent any? Does recourse to a rule really obviate
plausible alternatives? When an approach promises to accomplish
something, we should check whether it follows through. Only then
can we evaluate its desirability relative to other approaches.
How can we make that call? Only by having a sense of the method
connecting an interpretation with the reasons proffered for reaching
it. Inquiring into method allows us to ask whether the way someone
pursues an inquiry can produce an answer to the question they ask.
Parts II, III, and VI analyze situations in which the way judges
pursue their inquiries cannot yield the results they claim to reach.
Outsourcing seeks to mask that disconnect.
Using ordinary language use to clarify the meaning of a statute
requires a method for determining which speech community is
relevant and how it uses a term.329 Developing that method involves
having an underlying explanation for why ordinary language
329. See supra Part II.B.2.
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provides the best guide to the extraordinary language of statutes.
That is a lot more complex than opening the King James Bible and
being done with it.330 But it can at least help us agree that opening
the King James Bible may not be a very good way to interpret a
statute.331
A theory, too, needs a method to actualize its goals. If textualism
is to represent audience understandings, it needs a method to iden-
tify them. And that requires deciding whose understandings count.
Those decisions in turn must rest on some notion of why those
people matter, and what reveals their understanding. This is more
involved than declaring a result that feels like it should be ob-
vious.332 But judicial interpretations, by definition, arise out of de-
bate: litigants work hard to ensure that things are not obvious. If
the requirements of a textualist method sound herculean, it is at
least worth noting that this is the sort of undertaking textualism
implies. It does not get textualism off the hook from articulating a
method to achieve its aspirations.333
Similarly, being bound by a system of interpretive canons means
having a method for choosing among plausible contenders in a given
situation. That requires taking a position on what makes canons
worthwhile or what lends them interpretive power. That invites
more effort and debate than just choosing a rule and applying it.
But that is the difference between reason and fiat.
In other words, before arguing about which sources are best and
which meanings are true, I suggest we first ask whether the way a
330. Cf. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998).
331. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
332. Cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court
holds that when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act says ‘Exchange established
by the State’ it means ‘Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government.’ That
is of course quite absurd.”).
333. In contrast, the “Congress-centered” approaches advanced in recent scholarship tend
to have more modest empirical claims that are more closely matched to articulated methods.
These approaches argue essentially that judges can gain insight into what members of the
enacting Congress knew about, and expected from, the statute (irrespective of their desires
about it). Methodologically, this school of thought identifies records and procedures that
provide legislators with information about the statute and its likely or anticipated effects,
allowing judges some insight into what legislators knew about the statute. See, e.g., Gluck,
supra note 134; Elementary, supra note 179 (arguing for the use of congressional rules as a
means of interpreting the meaning of statutory texts); Decision Theory, supra note 179
(arguing that Congressional procedures and records reveal shared understandings among
legislators about the projected effects of statutes).
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judge looks for whatever it is she seeks is likely to uncover it. Not
every opinion—perhaps not any opinion—can articulate a full blown
methodology for interpretation. But as my discussion indicates,
opinions employ a method whether they articulate one or not.334 It
would be nice if judges became more explicitly reflective about their
methods. But we can evaluate how their inquiry relates to their
conclusions whether they tell us about it or not.
And if, as Judge Easterbrook suggests, judges lack a method in
statutory interpretation because they lack the time and knowledge
it would take—well, perhaps we should find their exercise of power
wanting.335 Judges should not be like the man in the joke, who looks
for his lost keys under the streetlight just because that’s where the
light is. They have the responsibility—and, I suspect, the ability—to
develop more effective ways of looking. Critically examining the
logic underlying one’s assumptions can be difficult. Opening that
logic up to public debate can be intimidating. Revising it in light of
others’ reactions can be unsettling. But judges hold great power in
our society. Wielding it should be hard.
Focusing on method asks interpreters to justify their actions in
ways that are potentially subject to normative, empirical, and meth-
odological debate. That is not a failing; it is part of the point. It is a
first step in democratizing interpretation: giving up the veneer of
certainty, recognizing that judicial interpretation involves exercis-
ing authority, and justifying the way authority is wielded. Focusing
on method allows judges and commentators to evaluate and improve
interpretive approaches.
In contrast, when judges avoid debate with a claim to certainty,
we should get suspicious. Outsourcing has pretensions to democra-
tizing, but by denigrating debate it does the opposite. Articulating
the normative, empirical, and methodological bases of an interpre-
tive approach opens it up to the democratic process of deliberation
and dispute. It allows us—judges, commentators, audiences—to con-
sider how we should choose among alternatives. And it is realistic
about the fact that any alternative will inevitably be incomplete and
unsatisfying.
334. See supra Part V.A.
335. See Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 81 (“A conference about ‘best practices’ for legal
inquiry supposes that there are practices. In the field of legal interpretation, that assumption
is doubtful.”).
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That then may open up discursive room for a more consequen-
tialist inquiry into the larger ends of statutory interpretation.
Acknowledging that interpretation is a decision-making process
implies asking what norms should inform it. If we value the pro-
visionally stabilizing effects of judicial decisions, perhaps we em-
phasize long-term reliability. That might argue for deciding legal
issues by supermajorities, rather than allowing for precariously
split decisions subject to change at the next vacancy. It may likewise
push commentators to differentiate litigation outcomes based on
how much agreement they garnered, for instance by treating five-to-
four Supreme Court decisions as less presumptively solid than
those with greater support.
If, on the other hand, we value the judiciary’s participation in a
contentious public sphere that sets the terms of democratic legi-
timacy and influences legal culture, we may be less concerned with
consensus and more interested in reasoned engagement with dif-
ferent points of view. Our evaluation would then focus less on an
opinion’s ability to gain agreement and more on its internal logic
and responsiveness to others.
Or, if we think of the judiciary as primarily a faithful agent of the
statute-writing Congress, we may want interpretive justifications
to be grounded in congressional practice and knowledge. That could
lead us to examine the practical ways that judicial approaches affect
the distribution of power among the branches. There may be less
gained, in other words, in seeking an ultimately “correct” interpreta-
tive approach than in asking about the values a given approach
furthers in practice.
All this suggests an orientation toward statutory interpretation
that is normatively articulated, empirically modest, and method-
ologically focused. That orientation leaves interpreters and com-
mentators open to debate, and their positions open to revision. That
openness, I have suggested, furthers democratic goals where out-
sourcing obstructs them.336 Rather than taking disputation as a sign
of defeat, that is, we should see an eclectic, debatable attitude
336. See supra Part V.C.
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toward statutes as the principled course.337 Eclectic, moreover, is
surely a good way to describe the statutes that courts interpret.
337. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and its Implications for
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1243 (2015) (“[I]nterpretive eclec-
ticism, which need not be lawless, permits better responses to the complexities that a probing
of the concept of legal meaning reveals.”); Rakoff, supra note 325, at 1560 (“[T]here are many
legitimate and useful modes of statutory interpretation, ... and ... choosing the right one in
any given instance is not a question of ‘theory’ ... but of appropriateness or ‘fit.’”); see also
Staszewski, supra note 251, at 245-48 (arguing that interpretive method is properly variable
across cases and resists consistent ordering).
